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OF MARKETS AND MEDIA: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, THE NEW MASS MEDIA, AND
THE POLITICAL COMPONENTS OF CULTURE
ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT*
Over the past forty-five years, the role of cable television in
the United States has undergone dramatic changes. Originally
built to enhance broadcast television, cable television has become
an independent source of television programming. As a result, it
is now in direct competition with over-the-air broadcasters. In
1992, Congress overrode a presidential veto to enact the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,
which, among other things, subjects the cable industry to rate
regulation by the Federal Communications Commission and
requires cable operators to carry the signals of a specific number
of local broadcast television stations. Soon after the Act became
law, cable television system operators and programmers brought
an action challenging the latter provisions, known as the must-
carry provisions, in Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission.
In this Article, Professor Bhagwat examines the Supreme
Court's application of current First Amendment doctrine to
government regulation of mass media. He briefly summarizes the
current regulatory and economic structure of the cable industry.
Next, starting from the Supreme Court's decision in Turner, he
finds that the Court's traditional First Amendment analysis
generates confusion when applied to mass media regulation
because of inconsistencies existing in the Court's theoretical
framework. Professor Bhagwat seeks to define an alternative
theoretical groundwork. He argues that the First Amendment
should be viewed instrumentally, and that wide access to ideas and
diversity of speech are constitutionally favored results. He further
argues that many modem reform proposals are constitutionally
suspect because they define political speech too narrowly, and
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therefore incorporate political biases. Based on these conclusions,
Professor Bhagwat proposes an alternative First Amendment
analysis governing mass media regulation that replaces the current
two-tier analysis with a unitary test. He concludes by considering
the implications of his new approach for particular mass media
regulation.
INTRODUCTION
This Article describes the inadequacy of the Supreme Court's
current First Amendment doctrine when applied to government
regulation of the mass media and seeks to develop a better, more
tailored constitutional standard, with a particular focus on
constitutional limits on regulation of the cable television industry. As
a convenient starting point, the Article uses the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission.' The first part of this Article briefly
summarizes the current regulatory and economic structure of the
cable industry and then demonstrates that the well-settled analysis
employed by both the majority and the dissent in Turner reveals deep
inconsistencies in the Court's current First Amendment doctrine.' In
particular, this Article demonstrates that both tiers of the two-tiered
analysis currently used by the Supreme Court in reviewing First
Amendment issues descend into incoherence when applied to cable
television regulation, as well .as when applied to other mass media
regulation. First, the Court's current, broad definition of what
constitutes "content-based" regulation is flawed because it fails to
recognize that most mass media regulation necessarily takes into
account, to some degree, the content of the regulated speech. The
consequence of this flaw is a formalistic, and largely sterile, debate
over what constitutes "content." Contrary to the Court's current
doctrine, this Article argues that the relevant inquiry is not whether
content matters, but how it should matter. Second, the Ward/O'Brien
balancing test,3 which has come to dominate the Court's review of
1. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
2. In Turner, the Court appeared to uphold conditionally the constitutionality of the
so-called "must-carry" provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Cbmpetition Act of 1992 §§ 4, 5, 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535 (Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter 1992
Cable Act], which requires cable operators to carry the signals of local broadcast stations.
Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2460-70.
3. "Ward/O'Brien balancing" is the Supreme Court's current "intermediate scrutiny"
test in the First Amendment area. For a detailed discussion of the test, see infra notes
119-32 and accompanying text.
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content-neutral regulation, is essentially unworkable in the mass
media context because it does not direct the analysis, or cabin the
discretion, of a reviewing court. Finally, Part I of the Article
concludes that the difficulties with the Court's current doctrine can be
traced to an inconsistency in the Court's theoretical framework, which
wrongly presumes a world of atomistic speakers and fungible speech.
Contrary to this framework, especially in the mass media context,
speakers are not numerous, and all speech is most certainly not equal.
Following Part I's description of the problems inherent in the
Court's current jurisprudence, Part II of this Article seeks to define
an alternative analysis. Part II first sets forth a theoretical
groundwork. The key preliminary question is whether the First
Amendment should be viewed instrumentally-as a means to achieve
a better-functioning denocracy-or as a tool for individual self-
fulfillment. This Article posits that the instrumental view is clearly
the better one. At least two significant conclusions follow from this
premise: First, that the primary danger at which the Constitution is
directed is governmental action; second, that wide access to ideas and
diversity of speech are constitutionally favored results. Where the
Article departs from previous commentary is in arguing that rather
than defining diversity in a narrow sense, as encompassing only
different ideological perspectives within a narrowly defined "political"
sphere, diversity should be understood to require that all social values
and choices should be open to debate. Any expressed vision of the
just or desirable society should be accepted as protected speech on a
constitutional par with explicitly political speech. Indeed, the Article
demonstrates that the current theoretical attempts to distinguish the
political from other elements of the common culture are quixotic, and
themselves politically biased towards the mainstream.
Based on these arguments, this Article concludes, contrary to
recent commentary, that the historical preference in First Amendment
law for a free marketplace in ideas should be retained. Markets
remain the best means currently available to permit the dissemination
of goods, or ideas, freely and without governmental interference.
Other approaches to speech markets, which emphasize the role of the
government in controlling markets and media, risk disaster.
This is not to say that all regulation should be foreclosed. This
Article contends that, especially in the context of the mass media,
regulation to cure existing market dysfunctions is both desirable and
constitutionally permissible. Indeed, the First Amendment introduces
independent values into the marketplace that will sometimes call for
regulation even wheni standard economic theory might not. These
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values include a preference for diversity, even at the expense of
efficiency, as well as a very strong disapproval of continuing
governmental supervision.
Based on these considerations, this Article suggests that there is
a need to revise the Court's First Amendment doctrine governing
mass media regulation. The current two-tier analysis should be
replaced with a unitary test that prohibits any regulatory preferences
for particular types of speech, or for speakers qua speakers. In
addition, the test should restrict government regulatory efforts to
curing real, existing market dysfunctions, through the use of structural
measures. In other words, the government should be severely
restricted in the interests it may assert to defend direct regulations of
speech. Furthermore, in determining the appropriate measures, the
courts must consider the burden that such regulation imposes on
speech, and the availability of less burdensome alternatives. Finally,
the courts have a primary oversight role in this area that cannot be
abandoned on the basis of deference to elected branches.
The consequences of such an approach for regulatory policy are
complicated. With regards to cable, this Article contends that there
should be a strong constitutional preference for structural measures
such as common carrier regulation or access requirements, and an
avoidance of preferential legislation such as the must-carry rules.
The Article concludes by considering the implications of this new
approach for the regulation of other mass media, especially the print
media and the emerging interactive technologies of the "Information
Superhighway."
I. TURNER BROADCASTING AND THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL
FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
A. Background: The Structure and Regulation of Cable
In examining the state of modem First Amendment analysis in
the mass media context, the cable television4 industry provides a
logical starting point, both because of its growing dominance among
4. Cable television generally refers to systems that deliver programming to the
consumer through a wire, traditionally a coaxial cable, which enters the residence or
business of the consumer and is connected directly to a television. Turner Broadcasting,
114 S. Ct. at 2451-52; Daniel Brenner, Cable Television and the Freedom of Expression,
1988 DuKE L.. 329 332-34. This is in contrast to broadcast television, for example, which
delivers programs through electromagnetic signals transmitted over the airwaves, and
which therefore may be received by anyone with a television and antenna.
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the various mass media, and because, in recent years, regulation of
the cable industry has engendered extensive constitutional litigation,
which has tested and exposed the limits of traditional First
Amendment doctrine.' In the past fifteen years, cable television has
developed into the primary source of video programming,6 and
consequently, the primary source of both news and entertainment for
a majority of Americans. In Congressional hearings on the structure
and operation of the cable television industry, Congress found that by
1992, 60% of households with television sets had subscribed to cable,'
and by 1995 that figure had increased to 61.7%.8 Congress also
found that the vast majority of cable operators enjoyed monopoly
positions in their service area. In addition, by 1993, cable wires
"passed" 95% of the homes in the country." As a result, by the
early 1990s, cable operators possessed a unique and largely un-
5. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2445; Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S.
439 (1991); Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986); Alliance
for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc); Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct.
2608 (1995); United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Group W Cable,
Inc. v. City of Santa Cruz, 669 F.2d 954 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Cruz it. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415
(11th Cir. 1985); Omega Satellite Prods. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir.
1982).
6. The term video programming, as used in this Article, includes information and
entertainment provided over cable, broadcast television, VCR tapes, and a number of
other delivery systems. See 47 U.S.C. § 522(19) (defining video programming as
"programming provided by, or generally considered comparable to programming provided
by, a television broadcast station").
7. 1992 Cable Act § 2(a)(3), 47 U.S.C. § 521(a)(3).
8. Growth Rate of Top 100 Basic Subs Almost Doubles: Part I, 35 TELEVISION
DIGEST, May 8, 1995, available in WESTLAW, TELDIG database, 1995 WL 2872948
[hereinafter TELEVISION DIGEST].
9. 1992 Cable Act § 2(a)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2). In many instances, this monopoly
is protected by franchise requirements established by local authorities, but even in the
absence of exclusive franchises, monopoly rather than competition is the rule. 1992 Cable
Act § 2, 47 U.S.C. § 521. Evidence indicates that competition exists in fewer than one
percent of the localities served by cable. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United
States, 830 F. Supp. 909, 915 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), cerL
granted, 115 S. Ct. 2608 (1995); Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 39-
40 n.16 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
10. See In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Second
Report and Order, Recommendation to Congress, and Second Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 5781, 5848 & n.351 (1992) [hereinafter Video Dialtone Order];
Paula Bernia, Multiple, User-Friendly Services Must Drive Info Highway, TELEPHONY, Oct.
3, 1994, at 24.
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constrained power to control the access to information of the majority
of the American public."
Despite the enormous growth of cable in recent years, cable
television remains closely tied to the traditional broadcast television
industry. In early years, cable operators 2 carried only broadcast
signals; and even though, since the late 1970s and 1980s,"3 numerous
independent cable programmers 4 have come into being, broadcast
television stations, including in particular the major network affiliates,
continue to constitute the core of most cable systems' offerings."
Nonetheless, in recent years cable operators have obtained increasing
amounts of programming by paying for the signals of independent
cable programmers, which today include the likes of Music Television
(MTV), Home Box Office (HBO), the Discovery Channel, Cable
News Network (CNN), C-SPAN, Nickelodeon, and countless
others. 6  The industry is thus structured so that cable operators
11. For a history of the development of the cable industry from the late 1940s to the
present, see Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2451; see also PATRICK PARSONS, CABLE
TELEVISION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 12-24 (1987) (describing the history of First
Amendment issues in cable regulation); Fred H. Cate, The Future of Communications
Policymaking, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3-7 (1994) (summarizing history of FCC
regulations of cable).
12. Cable operators are "those who own the physical cable network and transmit the
cable signal to the viewer." Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2452.
13. The first satellite cable network, Home Box Office (HBO), began service in 1975.
See Brenner, supra note 4, at 329.
14. Cable programmers are "those who produce television programs and sell or license
them to cable operators." Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2452.
15. The legislative history of the 1992 Cable Act indicates that retransmitted local
broadcast programming accounts for about two-thirds of total cable viewing hours. See
S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1158;
see also Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 64 (D.D.C. 1993)
(Williams, J., dissenting) (describing the importance and popularity of retransmitted local
broadcasts on cable systems), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
16. See Brenner, supra note 4, at 329; PARSONS, supra note 11, at 22-23; GEORGE
SHAPIRO ET AL., CABLESPEECH: THE CASE FOR FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECrION 2-3
(1983). Independent programmers who produce and distribute video programming for
public consumption, but who do not own or control the broadcast or cable systems
necessary to deliver their programming to the public, obtain a part of their revenues from
payments by cable operators and a part from advertisers who purchase commercial time.
In addition, the programmers leave open some advertising slots on these stations to be
filled in with local advertising by the local cable operators. Apparently, however, the
volume of local advertising revenue that cable operators obtain is relatively trivial.
According to the undisputed evidence presented by one of the Turner litigants, the ratio
of revenue obtained by cable operators from subscription fees to the revenue obtained
from advertising is 25:1. Reply Memorandum of Time-Warner Entertainment in Support
of Summ. Judg. at 15, Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated
and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). For a description of the financing structure of cable
programming, at least as of 1988, see Brenner, supra note 4, at 337.
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typically pay programmers for their signal, rather than having
programmers pay operators for carriage.'
The growth of independent cable programming has fundamental-
ly altered the types of options available to viewers, because cable
programmers tend to provide far more specialized, "niche" program-
ming than do broadcasters. 8 This development is a predictable
consequence of the much greater capacity of most cable systems than
the airwaves. It is well known that broadcasters typically have an
incentive to carry programming that will appeal to the majority of
viewers, while ignoring minority tastes which fall below a relatively
high threshold in terms of number of viewers.' One predicted
consequence of this phenomenon is that broadcasters may limit
viewpoints disfavored or deemed controversial by any significant
portion of the population?' Cable operators, by contrast, are single
entities who control multiple channels. In addition, the number of
available channels on a cable system is greater than those available
over the airwaves."' As a consequence, the most effective means for
17. BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO EcoNOMics 218-20 (1992).
Either structure is conceivable, but because of the efficiency of bundling channels together,
and because of the greater ease with which operators are able to bill customers, the
industry has developed the former structure. Id. The payment structure may also be
related to the relatively high risk associated with new programming ventures and the need
for early income to permit programmers to develop programming before they have a large
enough audience base to attract significant advertising revenues. This phenomenon may
also explain why new cable programmers tend to seek financial backing from operators:
they must ensure a minimum viewer base. See Brenner, supra note 4, at 337-38 n.37.
18. PARSONS, supra note 11, at 22; SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 16, at 4.
19. This is due to of the limited number of television broadcast stations in any one
market and also to the fact that an individual broadcaster controls only one channel in a
given area. An example will demonstrate this point. Suppose a particular city, with a
population of 100,000, has three television stations. Suppose, also, that 60% of the
population prefer to watch sit-coins, 15% prefer soap operas, 15% prefer news programs,
and 10% prefer nature shows. At any given time, all three stations will prefer to carry a
sit-coin because each will have an expected audience share of 20%, assuming that all
provide programming of similar quality. Any other choice will lead to a lower share. This
example, of course, somewhat oversimplifies the true situation, but the basic point holds.
20. See Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information
Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062,1082 n.115 (1994) [hereinafter The Message in the
Medium].
21. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2452 ("More than half of the cable systems in
operation today have a capacity to carry between 30 and 53 channels.") (citing 1994
TELEVISION AND CABLE FACrBOOK 1-69). "[A]bout 40 percent of cable subscribers are
served by systems with a capacity of more than 53 channels." Id.; see also Jeff Peline, Pac
Tel Expected to Get Cable OK This Week, S.F. CHRON., July 19, 1995, at C1 ("[C]able
companies... typically [provide] 60 channels of programming."). Broadcast stations in
a locality typically number in the single digits. There is also sufficient programming
available to fill the capacity of most cable systems. In 1992, 78 national cable networks
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cable operators to maximize the number of their subscribers, and
therefore their revenue,2 2  is to provide a varied programming
package that will appeal to both majority and minority tastes. Thus,
even if a particular station will appeal to only a relatively small
minority of viewers, the cable operator may well carry it in order to
attract those viewers as subscribers, while using other channels to
attract other segments of the potential audience base.'
Another important development in the cable industry in recent
years has been a substantial amount of horizontal and vertical
integration.24 In particular, cable operator chains, known as multiple
system operators (MSOs),' have been purchasing local cable
systems, at such a rate that, by 1995, the five largest MSOs together
served over fifty percent of the nation's cable subscribers, thus
creating an extraordinary level of horizontal integration.26 At the
same time, most major cable programming networks today are owned
were in operation, a substantially higher number than the channel capacity of most cable
operators. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909, 915 (E.D.
Va. 1993), affd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 2608 (1995); see also
In re Implementation of Sections Twelve and Nineteen of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Development of Competition and Diversity in
Video Programming Distribution and Carriage, First Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 3359,
3361 (1993) [hereinafter Development of Competition and Diversity in Video Program-
ming Distribution and Carriage] (citing legislative findings prior to 1992 of 68 national
cable networks). By 1994 that number had risen to 106 national networks. See
Implementation of Section Nineteen of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, First Report, 9 F.C.C.R. 7442, 161 n.434 (1994).
22. Because of the very high fixed costs and relatively low marginal costs associated
with the provision of cable service, cable operators can attempt to maximize revenue by
offering incentives to sign up as many subscribers as possible. In other words, it is almost
always in the financial interest of a cable operator to make an additional sale.
23. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Andrew A. Bernstein, Note, Access to
Cable Natural Monopoly, and the First Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1663, 1686-87
(1986).
24. In the context of the cable industry, horizontal integration refers to ownership of
multiple cable systems by a single firm, and vertical integration refers to common
ownership of cable systems and cable programmers by a single firm. See 1992 Cable Act
§ 2(a)(5), 47 U.S.C. § 521(a)(5); 2 CABLE TELEVISION LAW: BEYOND THE CABLE ACT
59-61 (Frank Lloyd ed., 1994); OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 17, at 8.
25. An MSO is a firm which owns multiple cable systems in different jurisdictions.
For the last several years, the two largest MSOs in the country have been Tele-Com-
municaions, Inc. (TCI) and Time Warner. See Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co., 830 F.
Supp. at 915; TELEVISION DIGEST, supra note 8.
26. TELEVISION DIGEST, supra note 8. Indeed, the largest MSO, TCI, alone serves
almost 25% of the nation's subscribers. See Tony Jackson, Viacom Clincher $2 Billion Sale
of Cable TV Unit, FIN. TIMES, July 26, 1995, at 23. For Congress' findings on horizontal
integration, see S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 2d. Sess 32, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1133, 1165.
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at least in part by MSOs.27 Some commentators have argued that
this practice of vertical integration is efficient because it has ensured
mutual access to subscribers and programming.? Others have
suggested that cable operators have integrated into programming in
order to create barriers to entry for competing cable operations or
other transmission services that might represent competition for
established operators.29 In other words, it is possible that the
substantial vertical integration of the cable industry, in combination
with the horizontal integration, may permit MSOs to foreclose
competition in the transmission business by creating entry barriers
through control of programming.30  A major consequence of this
vertical integration has been claims by broadcasters that cable
operators favor affiliated programmers in selecting which signals to
carry and in assigning channel locations, at the expense of smaller
broadcast stations.3' Because of the monopoly that most cable
operators enjoy, and because of increasing horizontal integration
within the industry, some have viewed this alleged discrimination as
a serious threat to independent broadcasters and programmers,
providing the major impetus for the must-carry provisions of the
27. OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 17, at 245; see also 1992 Cable Act §2(a)(5), 47
U.S.C. § 521(a)(5); S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1992) (describing ownership
of major cable networks), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1158; David Waterman,
Vertical Integration and Program Access in the Cable Television Industry, 47 Fed. Comm.
L.J. 511, 515-17 (1995) (summarizing current state of vertical integration).
28. OwEN & WILDMAN, supra note 17, at 245.
29. See, e.g., Bruce A. Olcott, Note, Will They Take Away My Video-Phone if I Get
Lousy Ratings?: A Proposal for a "Video Common Carrier" Statute in Post-Merger
Telecommunications, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1558, 1583-88 (1994); Waterman, supra note 27,
at 517-23 (summarizing economic theory and empirical evidence supporting foreclosure
theory). Indeed, it has been claimed that cable operators have obtained control over
programmers by exacting ownership interests as the price for carriage of the programmer's
channel. See, eg., 1992 Cable Act § 12,47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(1) (instructing FCC to prohibit
such conduct).
30. For example, if the ability to provide HBO or CNN is essential to the success of
a cable operator's potential competitor (whether it is another cable operator or an
alternative technology provider such as satellite-based systems), then if the local operator
owns that essential programmer, the local operator may be able to prevent effective
competition from developing by denying access to the necessary programming. An
essential assumption of any such theory, however, is that no substitutes are available for
some particular programming, or that there are substantial entry barriers in the video
programming market. See OVEN & WILDMAN, supra note 17, at 220. However, the large
number of national cable networks that exist today challenges these assumptions. Id.
31. See Brief for Appellee at 23-24 & nn. 10-13, Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994); id. at 40 n.26 (citing evidence of cable systems dropping
broadcasters in favor of programmers in which the cable system had an equity stake);
Waterman, supra note 27, at 512 & n.3, 524 (citing evidence of complaints).
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Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992.32
On the regulatory side, the dominant factor for the cable industry
has been the almost universal existence of municipal franchise
requirements and the imposition of conditions as the price of a
franchise.33 These franchises, which have often been exclusive, have
been justified by reference to the "natural monopoly" structure of
cable,34 though there is some dispute over whether the monopoly
status which characterizes most cable operations is a consequence of
the very economic structure of the industry, or whether it is merely
a product of regulation.35
32. See 1992 Cable Act §§ 2(a)(4)-(5), 47 U.S.C. § 521(a)(4)-(5); see also Turner
Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2454-55 (discussing the effects that horizontal integration in the
industry has had on the viability of local broadcasters).
33. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 16, at 13-14; Brenner, supra note 4, at 344-50. The
most important of these are the congressionally authorized, and widely adopted,
requirements that operators set aside channel space for Public, Education, and
Government access (PEG), see 1992 Cable Act § 10(c), 47 U.S.C. § 531, which have
themselves engendered numerous First Amendment challenges, Chicago Cable
Communications v. Chicago Cable Comm'n, 879 F.2d 1540 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1044 (1990). See also Donald W. Hawthorne & Monroe E. Price, Rewiring the First
Amendment: Meaning, Content and Public Broadcasting, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ.
499, 508-10 & n.48 (1994) (describing cases in which PEG requirements engendered First
Amendment challenges). Another standard condition mandated by the Cable Com-
munications Policy Act of 1984 is that all areas of a jurisdiction, including lower-income
areas, be served by the operator. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 2,47 U.S.C.
§ 541 (1988 & Supp. 1993) [hereinafter 1984 Cable Act]. The 1984 Cable Act prohibits
franchising authorities from requiring particular programming as a condition of a franchise.
Id. § 2,47 U.S.C. § 544. Franchisors are, however, permitted to impose requirements "for
broad categories of video programming or other services." Id. § 2, 47 U.S.C. § 544.
34. For a fascinating discussion of the economic theory underlying franchising and
regulation of "natural monopoly" utilities, see Oliver Williamson, Franchise Bidding for
Natural Monopolies-In General and With Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73 (1976).
The constitutionality of exclusive franchising occasionally has been challenged. See Los
Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986). For an enlightening
discussion in such a case by Judge Posner of the theory of natural monopoly and its
relation to exclusive franchising, see Omega Satellite Prod. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d
119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982).
35. Compare *Omega Satellite Prod., 694 F.2d at 126 (finding cable to be a natural
monopoly) and Daniel Brenner, Cable Franchising and the First Amendment, 10 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 999, 1013-19 (1988) (same) with Thomas Hazlett, Private Monopoly
and the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis of the Cable Television Franchise, 134 U.
PA. L. REV. 1335, 1346-75 (1986) (questioning whether cable satisfies the requirements of
natural monopoly theory and arguing that even if it does, the granting of exclusive
franchises may still not be sound policy). For a technical discussion of the theory of
natural monopoly, subadditivity of costs, and contestable markets, see WILLIAM BAUMOL
ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982).
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At the federal level, regulation of cable has come primarily from
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and has been
grounded from the beginning on the FCC's expressed concern that the
growth of the cable industry might threaten the broadcast industry
and the benefits of "free television." Beginning in 1962, the FCC
started to require some cable operators to carry, upon request, the
signals of local broadcasters operating in the region where the cable
operator was providing service, 6 and in 1966 the FCC extended
these original "must-carry" requirements to most of the cable
industry.37 These rules remained at the center of the FCC's
regulation of cable until 1985, when the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck them down as -violating the First
Amendment rights of cable operators. 8
Congress took its first major step towards regulating the cable
industry with the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.' 9
Among other things, the 1984 Act prohibited most rate regulation of
cable services' and, in a provision with important long-term policy
implications, stated that cable systems would not be regulated as
common carriers.4' In other words, the Act guaranteed that cable
operators would retain their right to select the programming that
would be carried over their systems. However, to ensure commercial
programmers unaffiliated with the cable operator access to cable
operators' audiences, Congress sought to create a system of leased
access to channels for these commercial programmers.42
36. See Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459,464 (1962), aff'd, 321 F.2d
359 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
37. CATV Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725,745 (1966), affd sub nom. Black
Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968). For a history of the FCC's must-
carry regulations, see Elizabeth A. Cowles, Note, Federal Communications Commission,
Must-Carry and the Continuing Search for a First Amendment Standard of Review for
Cable Regulation, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1248, 1249-52 (1989); see also United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 163-67 (1968) (reciting history of FCC regulation
of cable).
38. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1169 (1986). A revised version of the rules was again struck down in Century
Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292,304 (D.C. Cir. 1987), clarified, 837 F.2d 517
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
39. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.). Many of the provisions of the 1984 Act were modified or repealed by the 1992
Cable Act.
40. Id. sec. 2, § 623, 98 Stat. at 2788 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 543).
41. Id. sec. 2, § 621, 98 Stat. at 2786 (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 541(c)).
42. For a summary of the 1984 Act's provisions, see Brenner, supra note 4, at 350-52.
The common carrier and leased-access provisions, both of which survived the 1992
legislation, are codified at 47 U.S.C. § 541(c) and 47 U.S.C. § 532, respectively. The leased
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In addition to these provisions, Congress also codified the FCC's
so-called cable/telco cross-ownership prohibition, which prohibits
telephone companies ("telcos") from providing cable service in their
service area.43 These cross-ownership rules, which the FCC first
adopted in 1970," were originally designed to protect the then-
nascent cable industry from domination by telephone companies and
to ensure that cable did not become an adjunct to the telcos' existing
telephone monopolies.45 In 1992, however, the FCC concluded that
the cross-ownership prohibition was no longer necessary, given how
well-established the cable industry had become, and therefore recom-
mended that Congress repeal the prohibition.46 Moreover, the
cable/telco cross-ownership restriction has recently been the subject
of a series of First Amendment challenges.47 In these cases, every
court that has considered the issue to date has struck down the cross-
ownership bar as violative of the First Amendment rights of telephone
access provisions have generally not been perceived to be very successful, at least in part
because of the lack of clear guidelines for pricing leased access channels. See H.R. REP.
No. 628, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40 (1992).
43. 1984 Cable Act, Pub. L. No. 98-549 sec. 2, § 613, 98 Stat. 2779, 2785 (current
version at 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)). Section 533(b) prohibits local telephone companies from
providing "video programming directly to subscribers" in their service areas, or from
supplying their facilities to affiliated entities who intend to use the facilities to provide
video programming to subscribers. Id. Video programming, in turn, is defined as "pro-
gramming provided by, or generally considered comparable to programming provided by,
a television broadcast station." Id. sec. 2, § 602, 98 Stat. at 2781 (current version at 47
U.S.C. § 522(16)). The FCC has interpreted this provision as static, so that the relevant
comparison is to programming provided by broadcasters in 1984. Video Dialtone Order,
supra note 10, 7 F.C.C.R. at 5820. At the time of this writing, both Houses of Congress
were considering legislation to repeal the cross-ownership ban. See S. 652, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 202 (passed June 15, 1995); H.R. 1555, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1995). The
fate of this legislation, however, remains uncertain.
44. 47 C.F.R. § 63.54 (1970); see Application of Tel. Cos. for Section 214 Certificates
for Channel Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Sys., 21
F.C.C.2d 307 (1970), modified, 22 F.C.C.2d 746 (1970), affd sub nom. General Tel. Co.
v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971) [hereinafter Section 214 Certificates].
45. Section 214 Certificates, 21 F.C.C.2d at 323-26.
46. Video Dialtone Order, supra note 10, 7 F.C.C.R. at 5847-51. In this Order the
FCC also authorized telcos to provide so-called Video Dialtone platforms, through which
telcos would be able to sell video transmission capacity to unaffiliated programmers on a
common carrier basis. Id. at 5789-99. During discussions concerning the 1992 Cable Act,
Congress considered revocation of the cross-ownership bar, but ultimately elected not to
do so. S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 46-47, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133,
1179-80.
47. See infra note 48. The impetus for the constitutional challenges to 47 U.S.C. §
533(b) appears to have been the release of the FCC's Video Dialtone Order in August of
1992. Video Dialtone Order, supra note 10, 7 F.C.C.R. at 5781. The Order permits
telephone companies to begin providing video programming to subscribers on a common
carrier basis, thereby providing competition to incumbent cable operators. Id. at 5859-60.
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companies, holding that the law cannot survive intermediate
scrutiny.4 8 The issue is now pending in the Supreme Court.
With the 1992 Cable Act,4 9 Congress revisited the area of cable
regulation and changed its course almost 180 degrees, replacing what
had become practically a laissez-faire system with a system of wide-
ranging controls based upon the model of utility regulation. First and
foremost, the 1992 Act imposed extensive rate regulation on the cable
industry." Additionally, and second only to rate regulation in
importance, are the must-carry5' and retransmission consent 2
provisions of the 1992 Cable Act. The more constitutionally
problematic of these are the must-carry rules contained in sections
four and five of the Act.53
To summarize briefly, section four sets forth the must-carry rules
for commercial broadcasters. It requires cable operators to carry,
upon request, the signals of local commercial television stations, up to
a specified maximum.54 The cable operator must carry the broad-
48. The leading challenge was filed by Bell Atlantic in Virginia in December of 1992.
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993), cert.
granted, 115 S. Ct. 2608 (1995). At least one other appellate court and several district
courts have also ruled that 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) is unconstitutional. See US West v. United
States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir. 1994); Southern New England Tel. Co. v. United
States, No. 3:94-CV-80 (DJS), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7212, at *24 (D. Conn. April 28,
1995); Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721,737 (N.3. Ill. 1994); BellSouth
v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335,1344 (N.D. Ala. 1994); US West v. United States, 855
F. Supp. 1184, 1193 (W.D. Wash. 1994), affd, 48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1994). For a detailed
discussion of the background and reasoning of the leading challenge to § 533(b), see Susan
Ross, A Decade After Divestiture: Regional Bells, Video Programming and the First
Amendment, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 143 (1995).
49. 1992 Cable Act, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections
of 47 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1993)). The 1992 Cable Act represents the most significant effort
by Congress to date to regulate the cable television industry. As of this writing the fate
of many of the provisions of the 1992 Act, including notably rate regulation, remain in
doubt. See S. 652, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (passed June 15, 1995); H.R. 1555, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1995).
50. 1992 Cable Act, sec. 3, §623, 106 Stat. 1460, 1464 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 543). The FCC and local franchising authorities are together required to
prescribe rates for a defined "basic service," and the FCC is further instructed to establish
guidelines for what would constitute "unreasonable rates" for other services, all on the
basis of costs and revenues, on the model of traditional utility regulation. Id sec. 3, § 623,
106 Stat. 1460, 1464-71 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 543).
51. Ld. sec. 4, 5, §§ 614, 615, 106 Stat. at 1471-81 (current version at 47 U.S.C. §8 534,
535).
52. Id sec. 6, § 325, 106 Stat. at 1482 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 325).
53. ld. sec. 4,5, §§ 614, 615, 106 Stat. at 1471-81 (current version at 47 U.S.C. 88 534,
535).
54. 1992 Cable Act, § 4, 47 U.S.C. § 534. If the number of channels allocated for a
particular operator exceeds the number of local commercial stations, the cable operator
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casters' signals in their entirety, and the cable operator is prohibited
from seeking or accepting compensation for carriage of the signal.55
Section five imposes similar carriage obligations for the signals of
"qualified noncommercial educational television stations,"56 except
that the number of channels that must be allocated to carriage of such
stations is more limited than the number required in the commercial
setting.57 If no local noncommercial station exists, however,
operators must import and carry the signal of a distant noncommercial
station. 8
In addition to rate regulation, must-carry, and retransmission
consent, Congress enacted a number of other, less intrusive measures
in the 1992 Cable Act designed to correct perceived competitive
problems in the cable industry. In particular, to prevent cable
operators from using their market power in distribution to gain or use
power in the programming market, in section twelve Congress
directed the FCC to promulgate regulations governing carriage
agreements between cable operators and programmers and prohibiting
operators from discriminating against unaffiliated programmers.59 In
section nineteen, to protect competition in the distribution market,
Congress directed the FCC to enact regulations prohibiting satellite
programmers affiliated with a cable operator from discriminating
against other distributors or from entering into exclusive contracts
is also required to carry the signals of qualified low-power stations. § 4, 47 U.S.C. §
534(c). In determining whether a low power station is "qualified," the FCC may consider
whether "the provision of such programming by such station would address local news and
informational needs which are not being adequately served by full power television
broadcast stations." § 4, 47 U.S.C. § 534(h)(2)(B).
55. § 4, 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(10).
56. § 5, 47 U.S.C. § 535(1). These are essentially stations that are either licensed as
such by the FCC and eligible for grants from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting or
are owned by a municipality and transmit educational programming. lML
57. § 5,47 U.S.C. § 535(b)-(c). Systems with 12 or fewer channels must carry one such
station, systems with 13 to 36 channels must carry between one and three such stations,
while systems with greater than 36 channels must carry all local stations requesting
carriage, except that they need not carry more than three stations if substantial duplication
of programming would result. § 5, 47 U.S.C. § 535(b), (e).
58. § 5, 47 U.S.C. § 535(b)(3)(B). The flip side of the 1992 Cable Act's must-carry
rules is the retransmission consent provisions, which prohibit cable operators from
retransmitting commercial broadcast station signals without express authority of those
stations. § 6, 47 U.S.C. § 325(b). This provision is obviously in tension with the must-
carry rules, and so broadcast stations are required to elect between must-carry and
retransmission consent rights, with the right to re-elect every three years. Id.
59. § 12, 47 U.S.C. § 536.
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with their affiliated operator.6° Finally, in section eleven, Congress
directed the FCC to begin proceedings within one year that would
address the perceived problems of integration in the cable industry.61
The Act directs the FCC to consider limiting the size of cable
operators and the number of channels an operator may dedicate to
affiliated programmers, and to consider restricting the right of
operators to engage in programming at all.6'
B. The Turner Decision: Tiers, Tests, and Incoherence
Soon after the passage of the 1992 Cable Act, a group of cable
operators and programmers initiated the inevitable constitutional
challenge to the must-carry provisions before a three-judge panel of
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.'
After a divided court granted summary judgment to the government
defendants,' the plaintiffs took a direct appeal to the Supreme
Court.6' This appeal produced the opinion in Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,66 in which the
Court for the first time seriously grappled with the First Amendment
issues that federal and state government regulation of cable television
raised. While the Court had touched upon the subject of the cable
industry in previous cases,67 and indeed had gone so far as to
60. § 19, 47 U.S.C. § 548; Development of Competition and Diversity in Video
Programming Distribution and Carriage, supra note 21, at 3359 (FCC Order implementing
congressional directive).
61. § 11, 47 U.S.C. § 533(f).
62. Id.; see also In re Implementation of Sections Eleven and Thirteen of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Horizontal and Vertical
Ownership Limits for Cable Television, Second Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 8565 (1993)
[hereinafter Horizontal and Vertical Ownership Limits] (presenting FCC implementation
of congressional directive).
63. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32,51 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated
and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). In light of the D.C. Circuit's decisions in Quincy
Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986),
and Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), clarified, 837
F.2d 517, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988), Congress was aware of the possible
constitutional problems with the must-carry rules, and therefore provided for the
convening of a three-judge court in the event of a constitutional challenge, with a right of
direct appeal to the Supreme Court in the event the provisions were held unconstitutional.
1992 Cable Act § 23, 47 U.S.C. § 555(c).
64. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32,51 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated
and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
65. 114 S. Ct. 38 (1993).
66. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
67. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986);
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984); United States v. Midwest Video
Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968);
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recognize that cable programming and operations involved speech
entitled to First Amendment protection,' the Court had never had
occasion to review the constitutionality of a particular regulatory
regime. While the Turner Court did not definitively resolve the
constitutionality of the must-carry provisions, choosing instead to
remand for further factual findings, it set forth a framework to be
applied on remand.69 Thus, with Turner, the Court appears to have
chosen general standards for First Amendment review of cable
regulation.
The most noteworthy aspect of the Turner decision is that, even
though it is the Court's first serious attempt to apply the First
Amendment to a new and extremely important communications
medium, the Court's analysis reveals no substantial doctrinal revisions
or innovations. Both the majority and the dissent agreed that the
case could and should be resolved under the Court's "settled" First
Amendment doctrine." That doctrine, in essence, consists of the
now-familiar two-tier analysis, whereby regulations that are "content-
based"' are subject to exacting, "strict" scrutiny and will be upheld
only if necessary to achieve a compelling government interest, while
regulations that are "content-neutral"' are tested only under the
more forgiving O'Brien balancing test.73 Indeed, the Justices
displayed remarkable unanimity regarding the general doctrinal
analysis to be used, even though the Court fragmented badly over the
application of its First Amendment doctrine to the facts and over the
proper result in the case.74
cf. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) (upholding tax on cable service).
68. See Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. at 494-95.
69. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2470-72.
70. Id. at 2457,2458-59; id. at 2476-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
71. The term "content-based" generally refers to regulations that distinguish between
speech based on subject matter. For a discussion of the difficulties the Court has faced
in defining this term, see infra Part I.B.1.
72. Content-neutral regulations are those that are not content-based. For a discussion
of the Ward/O'Brien test, see infra notes 119-32 and accompanying text.
73. For a general description of the two-tier analysis, see, e.g., Turner Broadcasting,
114 S. Ct. at 2458-59; id. at 2477-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 112 (1991); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Arkansas
Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231-32 (1987).
74. Justice Kennedy announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion,
most of which garnered majority support, though the particular majority shifted through
different parts of the opinion. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2451-70. However, the
critical Section H.I-B of Justice Kennedy's opinion, which sets forth the issues to be
considered on remand, secured only four votes. Id. at 2470-72. Justice Blackmun filed a
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In particular, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, after rejecting
the government's argument that cable regulation should be subject to
the lower level of scrutiny applied to the regulation of broadcast
television,75 affirmed the lower court's critical conclusion that the
must-carry rules were content-neutral. 76 The Court then remanded
with directions to take evidence to determine if the must-carry rules
did in fact advance their stated purpose of preserving free television,
and if so, whether the rules were narrowly tailored, that is, whether
they burdened substantially no more speech than necessary, and
whether there existed no "less restrictive means" to achieve Congress'
ends.77
concurring opinion, though he joined Justice Kennedy's opinion in full. Id. at 2472-73
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and in the
judgment, in which he agreed with much of Justice Kennedy's doctrinal analysis but
disagreed on the need for a remand, arguing instead that the must-carry rules were plainly
constitutional and therefore that the judgment below should be affirmed. Id. at 2473-75
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Finally, Justices
O'Connor and Ginsburg both filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part,
arguing that the must-carry rules were plainly unconstitutional, and that therefore the
judgment should be reversed. Id. at 2475-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); ida at 2781 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Because no consistent majority supported any particular disposition of the case, Justice
Stevens, as an "accommodation," voted to vacate and remand. Id. at 2475 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). For a detailed description of the
various opinions, see Marc Peritz, Comment, Turner Broadcasting v. FCC- A First
Amendment Challenge to Cable Television Must-Carry Rules, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 715, 738-52 (1994).
75. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2456-58 (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984);
FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 799 (1978); National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943)). The government argued by
analogy that the economic structure and market dysfunctions of the cable industry justified
the deferential standard of review that the Court had previously accorded to regulations
of the broadcast industry. Id. at 2456. The Court rejected the analogy, holding that the
broadcasting cases were based on spectrum "scarcity," a rationale that had no application
to cable, with its potentially limitless channel capacity. Id. at 2457. The Court also
rejected the argument that market imperfections alone could justify a lower level of First
Amendment scrutiny, pointing out that the Court had already rejected such an argument
in the context of the print media. Id. at 2457-58. Finally, in a critical paragraph, the Court
stated that while "the unique physical characteristics of cable transmission should [not] be
ignored when determining the constitutionality of regulations affecting cable speech ...
they do not require the alteration of settled principles of our First Amendment
jurisprudence." Id. at 2457.
76. Id. at 2458-64.
77. Id. at 2470-72. Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion agreeing with all of
Justice Kennedy's analysis, but suggesting that on remand the district court should defer
heavily to Congress' policy judgments. Id. at 2472-73 (Blackmun, J., concurring). As
noted, Justice Stevens did not join the portion of Justice Kennedy's opinion discussing the
remand, so that this portion commanded only a plurality. See supra note 74.
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Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion,' in contrast, argued that
the must-carry rules were content-based because they included an
explicit preference "for diversity of viewpoints, for localism, for
educational programming, and for news and public affairs," all of
which, in the dissenters' view, were content-based justifications for
regulation.79 The dissent then quickly rejected an argument that the
must-carry rules could survive strict scrutiny and concluded by arguing
that the rules could not even survive intermediate scrutiny under the
O'Brien test because they were not "narrowly tailored.""0 As this
Article will now demonstrate, these differences in the Justices
opinions go to the very core of what constitutes a "content-based"
regulation and what "narrow tailoring" entails.
1. Content, Diversity, and Product Markets
In the Turner case, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, Justice
O'Connor's dissenting opinion, and Justice Ginsburg's dissenting
opinion each applied the well-established content-based/content-
neutral dichotomy, and each agreed that if the challenged regulation
were found to be content-based, it would be subject to "strict
scrutiny."" Moreover, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor agreed that
if the regulations were content-neutral, they would be subject to anintermediate level of scrutiny- the ad hoc balancing approach known
78. Id. at 2475-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
dissent was joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas (in part). Justice Ginsburg
also filed a separate, short dissent endorsing the analysis of Judge Williams in dissent
below. Id. at 2481 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a more
complete description of the opinions in Turner, and the history of the litigation, see Peritz,
supra note 74, at 715.
79. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2477 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
80. Id. at 2478-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
81. See id. at 2458-69; id. at 2475-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); id. at 2481 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens did not join a portion of Justice Kennedy's content analysis, nor did he join an
earlier section in which Justice Kennedy rejected an argument in which the government
sought a much lower standard of scrutiny for cable regulation by analogizing to the Court's
cases dealing with broadcast regulation. See id. at 2473 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); supra note 74. Thus it may be that Justice Stevens does not
concur fully with application of the Court's two-tier analysis. However, if that is the case,
it would appear that he would support an even less stringent or detailed approach,
analogous to rational basis review. See id. at 2473 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that "intrusive regulation" of cable may not be
constitutionally problematic). Such an approach is even more susceptible to the objections
set forth in this article. See infra Parts I.B.2 and II.A.3. In any event, at least eight of the
nine Justices did not appear to question the traditional two-tier framework at all.
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as the O'Brien test.' Thus, the necessary and critical first step of
that analysis is, of course, to determine whether a regulation is
content-based and subject to the highest level of scrutiny. In general
terms, the Court defines content-based regulations as those that
distinguish between different types of speech and impose benefits or
burdens, based upon the subject matter or message of the speech.'
In most First Amendment litigation, the classification of a regulation
is likely to represent the decisive factor in the case, as it did in
Turner. A clear theory of what constitutes content-based regulation
would therefore appear essential to a coherent First Amendment
doctrine. At least in the context of mass media regulation, however,
the Court has simply failed to articulate such a theory, as the division
between the Turner majority and dissent reveal.84
The first, and probably foremost, fissure between the majority
and dissent in their discussions of content relates to the role of
"diversity of viewpoints" in the Court's jurisprudence, and, in
particular, to the propriety of the government explicitly fostering
diversity among speakers and viewpoints. On the one hand, Justice
Kennedy and the majority cite, as a government purpose justifying the
must-carry regulations, the government's interest in "assuring that the
public has access to a multiplicity of information sources," and in
assuring "that 'the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources' " occurs.' Thus, the majority's
view is that government policies designed to increase diversity among
speakers and viewpoints advance First Amendment values. In
contrast, Justice O'Confor's dissent asserts that any government
regulation designed to "ensur[e] access to a multiplicity of diverse and
antagonistic sources of information" is necessarily based on "the
content of what the speakers will likely say," and therefore is highly
82. See id. at 2469 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)); id. at 2479-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
83. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510,2516
(1995); Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2459 (citing Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846,
1850 (1992); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1988); City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981)).
84. For simplicity, this Article will refer to Justice Kennedy's entire opinion as the
"majority," and Justice O'Connor's opinion as the "dissent," without spelling out the
shifting majorities, pluralities, and dissents, except where relevant.
85. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2470 (quoting United States v. Midwest Video
Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 668 n.27 (1972) (plurality opinion) (quoting Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945))).
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suspect constitutionally.86 As such, the dissent flatly and fundamen-
tally contradicts the majority opinion.
The view expressed by the majority, that the government may,
consistent with the First Amendment, take steps to promote diversity
of speakers and speech, has deep roots in the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence, and in particular, in the jurisprudence
relating to regulation of the mass media. Statements expressing such
views can be found in cases as early as 1945,' and in a number of
subsequent decisions.8' Academic commentators also have generally
written in favor of diversity enhancement as a content-neutral
justification for speech regulation. 9 Moreover, the general principles
underlying such statements provide the basis for a well-established
line of cases in which the Court upheld economic regulation of the
press.9° Finally, the majority's views in this regard are unsurprising.
They follow naturally from the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor that
86. Id. at 2477 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent
also argues that the must-carry rules are content-based because Congress passed them, in
part, because of a preference for speech with particular "local" content, citing the 1992
Cable Act for the proposition that Congress chose to protect broadcasters in the must-
carry rules at least in part because "[b]roadcast television stations continue to be an
important source of local news and public affairs programming and other local broadcast
services." Id. at 2476 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
1992 Cable Act §§ 2(a)(6), 2(a)(8)(a), 2(a)(10), 2(a)(11), 4(h)(1)(C)(ii), 47 U.S.C. §§
521(a)(6), 521(a)(8)(a), 521(a)(10), 521(a)(11), 534(h)(1)(C)(ii), 534(h)(2)(B)). Judge
Williams' dissenting opinion in the lower court sets forth a similar view. See Turner
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32,58 (D.D.C. 1993) (Williams, J., dissenting),
vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
87. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
88. See, e.g., FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 594 (1981); FCC v.
National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 800 n.18 (1978); United States
v. Midwest Video, 406 U.S. 649, 668 n.27 (1972); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
89. See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 4, at 329, 373-74; Cowles, supra note 37, at 1275-79.
Indeed, in the academic literature there is at least some acknowledgement that diversity
enhancement may justify content-based regulation. See Hawthorne & Price, supra note
33, at 504-08. See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH 48-51 (1993) [hereinafter SuNSTEiN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH] (discussing diversity enhancement with regard to broadcasters). Professor
Sunstein in particular provides an impressively thorough and insightful theoretical
justification for intrusive governmental regulation, including content-based regulation, of
the media.
90. See, e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978);
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). As discussed infra
note 108, the level of First Amendment scrutiny to which applications of general economic
regulation should be subject remains in dispute.
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has dominated recent First Amendment discourse,91 since it is a
presupposition of a working marketplace of ideas that different views
are placed in the public arena so that they may compete against each
other.92
Nonetheless, at some level, the dissent's critique of the majority's
position that the must-carryrules are content-neutral is clearly correct.
Underlying the concept of diversity, and underlying any government
regulation aimed at promoting diversity, is the presumption that
content matters. If one of the reasons that Congress is seeking to
preserve broadcasters at the expense of cable programmers is to
enhance diversity in the speech market, then Congress must believe
that broadcasters will say things different from cable programmers.
As both Justice O'Connor and Judge Williams amply demonstrate,
such a belief, particularly the view that "localism" is advanced more
by broadcasters than cable programmers, clearly motivated Congress
when it passed the must-carry rules.93  Otherwise, Congress'
statements about the value of diversity94 would be nonsensical.
Moreover, the dissent's views in this regard, that regulation
promoting diversity is impermissibly content-based, 9 conform well
with another strand of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence
that has been particularly evident in recent years: the development
of an extremely strong, formalistic view of what constitutes content-
based regulation. Even though at one point in the 1980s, the Court
91. The metaphor originates in Justice Holmes's opinion in Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For more recent examples of the Court's
reliance on the metaphor, see Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115
S. Ct. 2510, 2516 (1995); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1519 n.11
(1995) (quoting Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,
55-56 (1988) (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,745-46 (1978)); FCC v. League
of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364,377-78 (1984) (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,390 (1969)); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,794 (1983); Con-
solidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Service Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 537-38
(1980); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
92. For an excellent general description of the marketplace metaphor, and a response
to recent critics of it, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA
L. REv. 949 (1995).
93. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2476-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 59 (D.D.C.
1993) (Williams, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
94. See S. REP. NO. 92,102d Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1133, 1191; H.R. REP. No. 628, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1992); 1992 Cable Act §§ 2(a)(8),
2(a)(9), 2(a)(10), 47 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(8), 521(a)(9), 521(a)(10).
95. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2479 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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appeared to be weakening its existing doctrine96 regarding content
by stating that any rules " 'justified without reference to the content
of the regulated speech' " would be found content neutral,97 that
trend has been firmly reversed in recent years." Instead, recent
opinions tend to agree that "illicit legislative intent is not the sine qua
non of a violation of the First Amendment."99 Rather, the Court has
focused upon whether the challenged regulation on its face or in its
purposes appears to rely on the content of regulated speech. As the
Turner dissent puts it, so long as regulation is "related to the content
of speech-to its communicative impact," it is content-based.'t°
Thus, even the most seemingly innocuous regulation, if it creates dis-
tinctions, imposes burdens, or grants exemptions based on what is
said, will be found content-based and likely will be struck down.01
96. Prior to the mid-1980s, the Court's content-based jurisprudence tended to be
extremely speech-protective, and the Court generally struck down any regulation that
distinguished between speech based on content. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Moseley, 408
U.S. 92, 95 (1972). For a discussion of the development of the "content distinction," and
the Burger Court's retreat from earlier speech-protective rhetoric, see Keith Werhan, The
Liberalization of Freedom of Speech on a Conservative Court, 80 IOWA L. REV. 51, 66-76
(1994).
97. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (emphasis omitted)); see
also City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (finding city
ordinance regulating adult motion picture theaters to be content-neutral regulation).
98. For one account of the Court's movement away from the Renton analysis of
content, see Werhan, supra note 96, at 70-76.
99. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2459 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991) (quoting
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592
(1983))).
100. IL at 2477 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Contrast this
with Justice Kennedy's statement that content-based laws are those that "distinguish
favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed." Id.
at 2459. This seems a better definition of viewpoint-based, rather than merely content-
based, regulation, since it condemns government hostility to the speaker's ideology, not
just the subject of the speech. The majority's analysis also focuses heavily on whether the
regulation at issue suppresses disfavored ideas, without considering whether it merely
favors other speech because of its content. Id. at 2458 (asking whether the challenged
Government regulation "stifles speech on account of its message"). For an attempt to
reconcile the majority's language with extant doctrine, see Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.
v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 192-93 n.18 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 2608
(1995).
101. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1516-17
(1993) (finding a municipal regulation's distinction between commercial and non-
commercial publications to be content-based and therefore invalid); Simon & Schuster, 502
U.S. at 116-17 (striking down law placing financial burdens on speech by an accused
criminal describing crime); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,231-32
(1987) (striking down tax applicable to general interest magazines, but not newspapers or
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What all of the above tends to demonstrate is that the critical,
first inquiry in the Court's First Amendment "test"-whether a
particular regulation is content-based-has devolved into an almost
talismanic focus on the word "content" and its meaning in particular
contexts, without any consideration of the reasons why content-based
regulation may be problematic."°  One particular and especially
troublesome manifestation of this phenomenon in the area of media
regulation relates to the effect of the Court's "content" jurisprudence
on product-based economic regulation of media markets. A dis-
tinctive feature of the mass media is that the primary players are
economic entities, often of very substantial size and economic might,
which operate in markets where the primary "products" sold are
speech, and often speech of a particular sort. Thus, the New York
Times and CNN sell "general news," SPY magazine and cable's
Comedy Network sell (among other things) satire, and The Weather
Channel sells weather forecasts. 3 Most of these players sell some
package of various kinds of speech. Moreover, the markets in which
these media players operate are large, commercially significant, and
can often be characterized by concentration, anticompetitive practices,
or other problems associated with market failure."°  Therefore,
special-interest magazines). This trend has in fact gone so far that in Discovery Network,
the Court forbade a municipality from drawing a distinction, in the course of regulating
newsracks on public property, between commercial publications and newspapers, despite
the fact that the Court's own cases (upon which the municipality had relied) accord a
lower level of protection to commercial speech. 113 S. Ct. at 1513-17. Of course, recent
cases have not entirely eliminated the purpose inquiry. A content-based purpose alone
will suffice to trigger strict scrutiny, Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2461 (citing United
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990)), but illegitimate purpose is not a necessary
condition. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
102. This development brings to mind Justice Holmes's observation that "[i]t is one of
the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter for a long
time cease to provoke further analysis." Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
103. The case of broadcasters is somewhat more complicated since, as has been pointed
out, the true "product" sold by broadcasters is audiences, sold to advertisers. See OWEN
& WILDMAN, supra note 17, at 3-4. Programming, or speech, is an input into the produc-
tion process. However, because programming is by far the most important input into the
production process, and because the content of programming is so intimately related to the
makeup of the final product, the viewing audience, the discussion in the text applies to
broadcasters largely without change since to regulate broadcasters' "production" of
audiences effectively, one must regulate their choice of programming.
104. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 214, 248-50 (1974); supra
notes 24-31 and accompanying text. The problem of concentration in broadcast, or at least
television broadcast, is well-known, given the dominance (at least to-date) of the three
major networks.
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these markets can be as much in need of governmental regulation as
other large and concentrated markets.
The problem is that for economic regulation to be effective it
must generally be tailored and industry-specific, focusing on particular
product markets. 5 But the product sold in these media markets is
speech of a particular content. The economic concepts of a product
and product market are rooted in the concept of substitutability-in
other words, product markets are defined based on whether, given a
variation in price, consumers will shift to available substitute
products. 6 In media markets, the question of substitutability turns
inevitably on the content of speech. Thus, the Washington Post is
certainly a substitute for the New York Times, and CNN may be a
substitute as well, but it seems certain that MTV is not. This is simply
a reflection of the fact that consumer preferences in speech markets
are aimed at what the speech is, both in form and substance. The
consequence of the above is that any economic regulation of speech
markets must employ categories based, at least at some formalistic
level, on the content of regulated speech,"° and a rule forbidding
any content-based regulation would be tantamount to prohibiting a
great deal of potentially important economic regulation in this area."0 '
105. The problem with employing only general regulatory schemes, such as the antitrust
laws, is that it removes from Congress the ability to tailor regulation to the specific
structures and problems of an industry.
106. See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.1 (1992) (describing standards used by the FTC
and the Department of Justice to delineate product markets); HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 89-91 (1994) (discussing general problems associated with
product market definition).
107. In the cable/telco litigation, Bell Atlantic relied on this reasoning to argue that the
47 U.S.C. § 533(b) prohibition on telco provision of "video programming" was a content-
based regulation of speech. See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F.
Supp. 909, 922-24 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S.
Ct. 2608 (1995). On appeal the Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, but based upon the
faulty reasoning that 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)'s definition of "video programming" regulated
only "the mode of delivery of the speech." Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United
States, 42 F.3d 181, 193 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 2608 (1995). In fact, it
seems clear that the statute limits not just how the programming is delivered, but also the
particular images which may be delivered. See supra note 43.
108. This is not to say that all economic regulation must run afoul of the First
Amendment, even under the Court's current doctrine. The Court has repeatedly
recognized that economic regulations of general applicability may be applied to media
markets without necessarily requiring any heightened scrutiny. See Turner Broadcasting,
114 S. Ct. at 2458 (citing Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)). As the Turner majority ack-
nowledges, however, even on this point the Court's jurisprudence is unclear as to whether
enforcement of such generally applicable economic regulation necessitates any heightened
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Such, of course, has never been either the aim of the Court's
jurisprudence or the result of the Court's decisions, though with
respect to the print media the constitutional status quo comes close to
this extreme. 9 In other areas, the Court has permitted regulation,
but only through the creation of arbitrary exceptions to its back-
ground rules, such as in the broadcast context." °  In Turner,
moreover, the Court has taken the next step, bluning its analytical
distinction between content-based and content-neutral rules in order
to sustain regulation."' Ultimately, however, such doctrinal
manipulation becomes difficult to defend, as Justice O'Connor's
dissent in Turner amply demonstrates. However, the dissent's
apparent solution, simply to enforce the Court's current doctrine to
the letter, seems equally unattractive, in light of both the internal
contradictions of that doctrine and the inability of the current analysis
to cope with the complexities raised by economic regulation of the
mass media.
The last substantial difficulty with the Court's current analysis of
"content," also highly relevant in the mass media context, has to do
with its treatment of speaker-based (as opposed to explicitly content-
based) regulation. Speaker-based regulations are those in which the
government burdens (or prohibits) the speech of a particular,
identifiable group of potential speakers. The modern origins of the
Court's treatment of such regulations appear in Buckley v. Valeo,"2
in which the Court struck down a federal law limiting the total
amount an individual could spend in a single year to support or
oppose a particular political candidate, based on the principle that
Congress could not "abridge the rights of some persons to engage in
political expression in order to enhance the relative voice of other
review, or is subject only to rationality review. Id. (comparing Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (declining to employ strict scrutiny) with Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566-67 (1991) (applying a heightened review)).
109. See, eg., Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231-32 (1987);
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592-93
(1983); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974).
110. See, e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775,796-97,
814-15 (1978) (upholding cross-ownership restriction on broadcasters); NBC v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 238 (1943) (upholding ownership restrictions for radio stations).
111. For earlier examples of such blurring, in somewhat different contexts, see City of
Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,46-47 (1986); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S.
641, 655-56 (1984); Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 466 U.S. 540, 545-46 (1983);
and the D.C. Circuit's recent decision in American Library Association v. Reno, 33 F.3d
78, 84-87 (D.C. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 47 F.3d 1215, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
112. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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segments of our society."" The cable parties in Turner argued that
this dictum requires that all speaker-based regulations must be subject
to strict scrutiny, a position that the Court in Turner rejected."'
Instead, the Turner Court said that Buckley stood only for the
proposition that "laws favoring some speakers over others demand
strict scrutiny when the legislature's speaker preference reflects a
content preference.""'  While the Court's basic conclusion here,
that all speaker-based regulations cannot be presumptively un-
constitutional, must be correct, the analysis adopted in Turner is
unsatisfying. First, at a doctrinal level, the Turner Court's reading of
Buckley is dubious-the regulation struck down in Buckley was not
directed at a group of speakers associated with any particular view
(unless one assumes that all rich people share a political outlook), and
did not reflect any clear "content preference." Second, the Turner
Court's treatment of Buckley gives no guidance as to when a speaker-
based regulation "reflects a content preference." This leaves a good
deal of uncertainty in the law, with a concomitant decrease in
protection for speech, especially since many speaker-based regulations
will have some differential impact on speech."6
2. The Ward/O'Brien Octopus
Under the Court's First Amendment doctrine, if a regulation is
found to be content-based, it is almost automatically un-
113. Id. at 49 n.55.
114. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2467.
115. Id.
116. The Court's problems have been particularly apparent in its struggles with
regulations that single out elements of the press or the press as a whole. Thus in
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591-91
(1983), the Court struck down a tax that had a substantial disparate impact on members
of the press, and in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,227-34 (1987),
it reaffirmed this principle. In its subsequent decision in Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S.
439 (1991), however, the Court upheld the application of a general sales tax to cable
operators, even though other members of the media, including print media and satellite-
based competitors of cable, were exempted. Id. at 444-53. The Court's reasoning, that the
segment of the press singled out in Leathers was not sufficiently small to raise the same
types of constitutional concerns as in the earlier cases, id. at 444-49, was again unsatisfying,
because it did not plainly explain when such concerns are raised. For a discussion of these
cases, see Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2467-69. The Turner decision epitomizes the
Court's difficulties: In that case, a five-person majority of the Court found that the
distinction drawn in the must-carry rules between broadcasters and cable programmers was
not based on content, and did not warrant strict scrutiny, while a four-person dissent found
otherwise. See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
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constitutional."7 If it is found to be content-neutral, however, it is
subject to intermediate scrutiny, and is reviewed under the four-part
test now known as the Ward/O'Brien balancing test, which in recent
years has come to dominate the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence." 8 This is the level of scrutiny to which the Turner
majority subjected the 1992 Cable Act's must-carry rules, and it is the
other major source of difficulty in the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence in the mass media context that this Article seeks to
demonstrate.
The current Ward/O'Brien test evolved from two different strands
of the Court's jurisprudence. The first, which originated in United
States v. O'Brien,"' concerned legislation regulating conduct with
expressive elements." This strand of the Court's doctrine is
concerned with government regulation of conduct, a subject that is
generally outside of the First Amendment purview, and becomes
subject to some heightened scrutiny only because of an incidental
burden on speech.'
The second relevant strand of the Court's jurisprudence grew out
of the Court's "public forum" doctrine, its decisions regarding
regulation of speech by the government on government-owned
property.'" That doctrine divides government-owned property into
117. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 124-28 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); cf Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211
(1992) (finding a "rare case" where a content-based law survives strict scrutiny).
118. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
119. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
120. In O'Brien the Court sustained the criminal prosecution of a Vietnam War
protester who burned his draft card, stating that a regulation of expressive conduct will be
sustained if "it furthers an important or substantial government interest; if the government
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction
on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest." Id. at 377.
121. For examples of cases examining regulations of expressive conduct, see Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2460-63 (1991) (upholding the constitutionality of a
state public indecency statute prohibiting nude dancing); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
410, 419-20 (1989) (reversing on free expression grounds the conviction of a protester who
burned the American flag).
122. The doctrine originated in dictum in Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S.
496, 515 (1939). The Court's most important recent venture into this area was in
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711 (1992), in which the
Court, by a 5-4 vote, held that the public spaces of airports are not public forums. Id. at
2711-12. For a summary (and critique) of the Court's current public forum jurisprudence,
see id. at 2715-20 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Other recent applications of
the doctrine include United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990); Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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three types and accords the highest level of protection to speech on
property that is designated a "traditional public forum."'" Even on
such property, however, the government may regulate the "time,
place, and manner" of protected speech on a content-neutral
basis," and in Ward v. Rock Against Racism,125 the Court
definitively set out the standards under which such "time, place, and
manner" regulations would be judged."z Thus, this strand of the
Court's doctrine, like the cases on expressive conduct, relates to an
area of government activity-regulation of use of its own proper-
ty-where the government often has reasons to act that are entirely
unrelated to speech.
In recent years, these two theoretically quite distinct areas of the
Court's doctrine have merged, as the Court in a number of decisions
has recognized that its tests for expressive conduct and for time, place,
or manner regulations are essentially identical."z The consequence
of these decisions has been that the Ward statement of the test has
become the standard formulation, applicable in all cases involving
expressive conduct or time, place, or manner restrictions. Ad-
ditionally, during the past several years, the Court has apparently
begun to merge its jurisprudence regarding regulation of "commercial
speech" into the Ward/O'Brien test. In its commercial speech cases,
the Court has set forth constitutional limits on the ability of
governments to regulate purely "commercial" speech such as
advertisements."z Recently the Court has remarked that its First
Amendment analysis of regulations of commercial speech is "substa-
123. Thus content-based restrictions on speech in traditional public forums are subject
to strict scrutiny. See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. The other categories are
"designated public forums" and "nonpublic forums," with respect to which the government
has ever-increasing discretion to regulate speech. See International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. at 2715-16 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Werhan,
supra note 96, at 76-85.
124. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
125. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
126. d. at 790-803. Such regulations will be upheld "provided the restrictions 'are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.' " IM at 791 (quoting Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
127. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456,2460 (1991); Ward, 491 U.S.
at 798; Clark, 468 U.S. at 298 & n.8.
128. The Court first set forth its commercial speech "test" in Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980), though the modern
doctrine itself can be traced back to Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 758-70 (1976). A recent application of these principles
can be found in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
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ntially similar" to the Ward/O'Brien test, suggesting that in coming
years the Ward/O'Brien formulation will come to govern commercial
speech regulation as well. 29
These doctrinal developments represent a pattern of gradual
expansion of the scope of the Ward/O'Brien test. As described above,
the test has relatively narrow roots, based on very particular strands
of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. As these strands have
merged in recent years, however, the Ward/O'Brien test has been
evolving slowly into a general standard for review of speech
regulations that are not subject to strict scrutiny, but which, because
they do burden speech, should be subject to some heightened scrutiny.
In Turner, that evolution seems to have reached its apogee, when the
Court applied the Ward/O'Brien test to a direct and general
regulation of speech that was neither a general regulation of conduct,
a regulation of speech on government property, nor a regulation of
purely "commercial" speech.3
The expansion of the Ward/O'Brien test, without any commen-
surate changes in its formulation, is extremely problematic because
the test is by its nature ad hoc, that is, it seeks to balance governmen-
tal interests entirely unrelated to speech with burdens on free
expression. Indeed, given the roots of the Ward/O'Brien test and the
theoretical difficulty of balancing such dissimilar values as, for
example, the burden on speech created by prohibiting overnight
demonstrations in a park against the disruptive effects of permitting
the demonstration, some degree of arbitrariness may be
inevitable.' In both the expressive conduct and public forum
contexts, the government is generally engaged in endeavors that are
unrelated to speech and are well within the authority of the
government. The governmental interests asserted to justify such
regulation are thus generally unrelated to speech issues.32
129. See Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,477 (1989).
130. One should understand that the fact that cable operators are "commercial"
enterprises does not make their speech "commercial speech." The Court's definition of
commercial speech is far narrower, encompassing only speech "which does 'no more than
propose a commercial transaction.' " City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113
S. Ct. 1505, 1512-13 (1993).
131. See generally Symposium, When is a Line as Long as a Rock is Heavy?:
Reconciling Public Value and Individual Rights in Constitutional Adjudication, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 707, 707-1104 (1994) (presenting various points of view on the problems of
balancing tests in modem judicial practice).
132. Indeed, this lack of relationship was originally a requirement of the Ward/O'Brien
test, though in later cases the formulation has been weakened, so that now the interest
must only be unrelated to the content of the regulated speech. See United States v.
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Therefore, when the government regulates in these areas, whether it
is regulating the harmful effects of conduct, or circumscribing speech
on government property to protect the other uses of that property,
the First Amendment analysis inevitably requires balancing the degree
to which the regulation burdens speech against the importance of the
government interest asserted. Because there is no obvious way to
compare such disparate values, this analysis leads to an extremely
subjective, and somewhat arbitrary and unpredictable doctrine."'
Furthermore, the difficulty of the analysis required by Ward/O'Brien
has inevitably pushed the Court to increase the deference the
government receives during judicial review, thereby weakening the
test and decreasing the constitutional protection for speech." Even
aside from any weakening, however, for the reasons discussed above
the Ward/O'Brien analysis is by its nature ill-defined, and probably
unavoidably so. The only factor that has made the Ward/O'Brien test
tolerable in the past is that the Court has only applied it in relatively
narrow contexts in which the government has imposed burdens on
speech that are either incidental or circumscribed.
None of these limitations hold true, however, in a case like
Turner, in which the Court is reviewing a direct and far-reaching
government regulation of private speech that uses private resour-
ces.'35 Such regulations raise far more serious concerns as to their
effects on speech and so should not be subject to the generally ad hoc
analysis of Ward/O'Brien. Moreover, they need not be. This is
because a direct government regulation should be (and is likely to be)
justified on the basis of First Amendment policy, since there is no
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
133. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 973 (1987) (criticizing the validity and lack of logical basis of balancing
tests); Brenner, supra note 4, at 362-63 (describing the Ward/O'Brien test's "predictive
value [as] dubious"); Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradox of Balancing Significant Interests,
45 HASTINGS L.J. 825, 837-843 (1994) (summarizing the debate over balancing); Werhan,
supra note 96, at 60-61, 61 n.60 (quoting Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Nebraska Press Assocation:
An Expansion of Freedom and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431, 463-64
(1977)) (summarizing long-standing debate over use of ad hoc balancing in First
Amendment analysis).
134. The most important example of this phenomenon is the severe weakening of the
"narrow tailoring" prong of the test in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, where the Court
held that to be narrowly tailored for the purposes of Ward/O'Brien, a regulation must
merely be "reasonable." 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
135. Cable operators certainly use some public resources, such as conduits and public
ways, in their operations, but this fact does not provide any justification for the must-carry
rules-nor could it, since the resources utilized are generally municipal, while the must-
carry rules are federal.
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obvious other reason (such as the harmful effects of conduct, or the
need to control the government's own property) for the government
to undertake such regulation. As a result, the judicial balancing
required in cases like Turner need not be ad hoc; rather, a reviewing
court should weigh burdens on speech against other speech-related
policies so that it may judge whether or not the challenged regulation,
on balance, furthers free speech interests, whatever those interests
may be. 36
Of course, this approach would be a departure from the typical
Ward/O'Brien analysis. But such a departure seems justified, given
the difficulties of applying the Ward/O'Brien analysis to regulations
such as must-carry. These difficulties are reflected in the enormous
disagreements among the Justices in Turner over the proper ap-
plication of the Court's supposedly "well-settled" First Amendment
analysis. For example, the majority and dissent disagreed sharply
over both the legitimacy of the government's asserted interest in
promoting diversity,137 and over the strength of the government's
asserted interest in preserving free broadcasting. 8 The majority
and the dissent also evinced quite disparate approaches to the
"narrow tailoring" prong of the Ward/O'Brien test. The dissent, in
the course of arguing that the must-carry rules were overbroad and so
failed intermediate scrutiny, clearly put far more teeth into the narrow
tailoring requirement than the Court's previous decisions, including
in particular the "reasonableness" formulation adopted in Ward v.
Rock Against Racism,'39 would appear to permit.1" The majority,
even though purporting to follow Ward/O'Brien and defer to Congress
on the choice of regulatory scheme, had a great deal of difficulty
describing how the lower court, on remand, should evaluate either *the
136. Such an analysis would also require reviewing courts to consider the availability
of other, less burdensome regulatory strategies that might better advance speech policy.
137. Compare Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2470 (asserting that public "access to
a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order") with
id. at 2477 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
promoting diversity is, by its very nature, a content-based regulation of speech). See also
supra notes at 84-94 and accompanying text (discussing differences between the majority
and dissent in Turner as to "diversity of viewpoints").
138. Compare Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2469-70 (finding the interest to be an
"important" one) with id. at 2480 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(finding the interest in free television insufficient to support broad must-carry re-
quirements).
139. 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989); see supra note 134.
140. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2479-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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adequacy of the government interests or the need for the must-carry
rules.' In other words, both the majority and dissent struggled
with, but were unable to overcome, the theoretical inconsistencies of
applying the ad hoc Ward/O'Brien test in this context, in which a
more focused analysis was appropriate.
C. Current Doctrine and Models of the Market
The Court's traditional First Amendment doctrine has never
worked well when applied to regulations of the modem mass media.
Until now, the Court has circumvented these problems through
arbitrary manipulation of its doctrine. Recent technological develop-
ments, however, have created vast, new mass media networks and
facilities, including especially cable television, which require extensive
regulation because of their physical and economic characteristics.
These developments have found the courts unprepared and lacking a
theoretical model for evaluating the constitutionality of these new
regulations. The Turner decision reflects this unpreparedness.
That technological change has produced doctrinal difficulties is,
of course, unsurprising. The current confusion, however, cannot be
attributed only to changing technologies. Rather, the courts'
difficulties in adjusting to new demands reflect an underlying
problem-an inconsistency between the Supreme Court's model of
First Amendment free speech rights and the realities of modem media
markets. As Owen Fiss has observed, the Court's First Amendment
model and jurisprudence are premised on "protection of the street
corner speaker."'42 This view sees the role of the courts as that of
defending the right of individuals to speak in the face of
governmental oppression, and the ultimate purpose of the First
Amendment as permitting political discourse, because it is an essential
element of democratic institutions.43 Professor Fiss's primary
141. ld. at 2470-72. Moreover, Justice Kennedy was unable to gather a majority for this
portion of his opinion. Indeed, there was an extraordinary amount of disagreement among
the Justices over the appropriate level of deference to Congress, ranging from almost total
deference, id. at 2472-73 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 2473-75 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment), to some deference, id. at 2470-71, to essentially
no deference, id. at 2480 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
2481 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1408
(1986).
143. Id at 1409-10. Professor Fiss traces this view of the purposes of the First
Amendment to Harry Kalven and Alexander Meiklejohn, and indicates that such a view
is widely shared today, citing among others Lee Bollinger and Robert Bork. See id. at
1409 nn.19-21 (citing Lee C. Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 YALE L.J.
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criticism of this traditional position is that it presumes that the critical
values it seeks to defend-individual autonomy and rich public
debate-are consistent with each other. According to Professor Fiss,
in an era when huge electronic media enterprises control most
information flowing to the public, that assumption simply fails. The
First Amendment, therefore, should not prohibit limited regulation of
what the broadcast media can say.'
Drawing upon these and other ideas, Cass Sunstein has advanced
an even stronger (and more interventionist) critique of current First
Amendment doctrine. Relying heavily upon the writings of James
Madison and the First Amendment dissents of Justice Louis Brandeis,
Professor Sunstein argues that the primary purpose of the First
Amendment is to protect and encourage the "deliberative discourse"
necessary to a well-functioning democracy with an active and
participatory citizen body.'45 Proceeding from this premise, and
from arguments about the effect of the New Deal on the concept of
"state action," Professor Sunstein concludes that the strong, current
bias in First Amendment law against state intervention in private
decisions about speech should be reconsidered. In particular, he
argues that when private choices are not fostering political
deliberation and a diversity of speakers and ideas, the First
Amendment supports, and may even require, government action
designed to foster such discourse and diversity. In pursuit of these
goals Professor Sunstein advocates and defends extensive regulation,
including content-based regulation, of the mass media.' 46
The criticisms leveled by Professors Fiss and Sunstein are
certainly well-taken, and in fact, the doctrinal difficulties recounted
above clearly reflect the theoretical inconsistencies that they identify.
In particular, the Court's great difficulties in analyzing "content" are
closely tied to the Court's First Amendment "model." Most impor-
tantly, the conflict between the Turner majority and dissent over the
role of "diversity enhancement" in First Amendment doctrine is a
438 (1983); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. LJ. 1 (1971)).
144. Fiss, supra note 142, at 1410-16.
145. SUNSTIN, supra note 89, at xvi-xviii, 17-28. Professor Sunstein contrasts
Brandeis's views with the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor championed by his frequent
co-dissenter Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and suggests that Holmes's jurisprudence
contains an internal inconsistency because it posits a skeptical view of "truth," and yet
assumes that some concept of truth will emerge from "competition" between ideas. Id.
at 23-28.
146. See id. at 53-92.
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product of the Court's "model" of First Amendment speech. The
Court's model is one of an atomistic marketplace, combining Justice
Holmes's "marketplace of ideas" metaphor-which, as Professor
Sunstein argues, has dominated the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence147 -with the "street comer speaker" identified by
Professor Fiss."4 In such a world, speakers and listeners are plen-
tiful, no individual speaker plays an essential or unique role in the
debate, that is, speakers are fungible, and no speaker or listener
possesses "market power" in the marketplace of ideas in the sense of
being able to shape significantly, on her own, the ideas and preferen-
ces of others. In such a world, the First Amendment value in
diversity and the prohibition of content-based regulation do not
conflict, because in such a world an unregulated market and a laissez-
faire governmental policy are the best means to ensure diversity.
Thus it is that the Turner majority is able to condemn all content-
based regulation, and yet laud governmental efforts to enhance
speaker diversity, while the Turner dissent is able to claim that any
effort to produce diversity presumptively violates the First
Amendment.
That free competition can be equated with diversity of speakers
and ideas in an atomistic market for speech is not a new insight. 49
Professor Fiss, citing Ronald Coase and Aaron Director, explicitly
identifies modem free speech law as the most important surviving
strand of a general plea for laissez-faire and limited government.15
The problem, of course, as Professor Fiss also points out, is that the
underlying assumption of the Court's model simply does not hold with
regard to the mass media, especially the electronic media."'
Speakers are not numerous, nor are they fungible, and the speech
choices made by one or a concentrated few members of the media
most certainly do influence the preferences of viewers and listeners.
147. See id. at 34. In Professor Sunstein's view this domination is unfortunate. I am
less certain. See infra part Il.A.2.
148. See Fiss, supra note 142, at 1408.
149. Indeed, the FCC has proceeded on just this premise in trying to ensure diversity
in the course of allocating radio spectrum. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S.
582, 600-01 (1981).
150. Fiss, supra note 142, at 1414 & n.26 (citing Ronald Coase, The Market for Goods
and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. EcoN. REv. PROc. 384 (1974); Aaron Director, The
Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J. LAw & ECON. 1 (1964)). Professor Kathleen
Sullivan has similarly identified the argument against government regulation of speech
markets with Coase, Director, Richard Epstein, and the libertarian ideology of the Chicago
School of economics. See Sullivan, supra note 92, at 952-53.
151. See Fiss, supra note 142, at 1409-10.
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In such a world-the world faced by the Turner court-a prohibition
on all content-based regulation may not further the First Amendment
value in diversity.
The other difficulties the Court has faced in drawing the
boundaries of upper-tier review in the First Amendment area are also
closely tied to the Court's vision of the speech market. Inherent in
the Court's atomistic model is an assumption of a unitary market, in
which speakers and speech can be substituted for one another. In the
world of the street comer speaker, that may be a reasonably accurate
description of the world; speaking on a soapbox may well have been
a substitute for distributing (or selling) a pamphlet or flyer. In the
world of the electronic media, however, that is almost certainly not
the case. Speaking in a city park is certainly not a substitute for
delivering a speech on primetime television. Indeed, it is not clear
that having the same speech reprinted in every major daily newspaper
would be a sufficient substitute. From this conundrum arises the
Court's confusion in reviewing regulation that is content-based
because it focuses on product markets.53 If all speech is fungible,
then such regulation appears pernicious, because it singles out
particular speech; but if separate speech markets exist, then it is surely
not problematic to regulate those markets separately, even if there is
some independent requirement of evenhandedness in that regulation.
Finally, these theoretical problems also contribute to the Court's
struggles in addressing speaker-based regulations, as well as its
difficulties in applying Ward/O'Brien to mass media regulation. The
relationship is in fact very similar in both cases-it arises from the
assumption that speakers are fungible. In a world of many speakers,
in which none is uniquely well-situated, it is not likely to be a rational
strategy to target one or a narrow group of speakers if one's purpose
is to control debate. The censorship or punishment must be clearly
tied to the content of that speaker's message; otherwise, someone else
will simply step in to say the same thing. Also, the deterrence
message might otherwise not be clearly communicated. Thus, under
the traditional view it is not terribly troublesome when regulation
singles out a speaker, or when the government burdens or silences
particular speech for non-speech related reasons. In the first case,
152. In fact, in such a world, as discussed below in part II.A.1, infra, the meaning of
diversity is not always obvious since, from the perspective of the media itself, the concept
of diversity may be associated more with diversity of product offerings with mass appeal,
such as sitcoms, cop shows, and news analysis, than with diversity of viewpoints.
153. See supra notes at 102-08 and accompanying text.
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other speakers will step in, and in the second case, other opportunities
to speak exist. In the world of the mass media, of course, neither of
those assumptions necessarily holds because scarcity-both of
speakers and of speaking opportunities-is very much the rule with
regard to the mass media, thus explaining the Turner Court's
difficulties in determining whether a law favoring broadcasters over
cable programmers is problematic, and whether the must-carry rules
are "narrowly tailored."
Despite inherent weaknesses, the Court's basic two-tier analysis
of First Amendment issues, with its strong bias against regulation, has
performed relatively well in defending individual speakers-generally
dissidents with unpopular views-from direct censorship by the
government.'- 4 The categories of that analysis are premised on the
existence of an atomistic marketplace of speech, speakers, and
listeners; and when those assumptions hold, the categories are
generally workable. With respect to regulation of the modem mass
media, however, where those assumptions assuredly do not hold, the
Court's categories tend to collapse, and its analysis consequently
fails.' What is needed at this point is a rethinking of those
categories and the underlying doctrine, based on a more realistic
model of mass media markets. At the least, such a reappraisal must
take into account the role of the mass media in today's society,
including its power to shape preferences and discourse through a
process of socialization. This is not enough, however. The analysis
must also take into account the danger that the government will seek,
through regulation of the media, to take control of that process itself,
since this is the primary danger addressed by the First Amendment.
It is to that theoretical rethinking that this Article will now turn.
II. A NEW PARADIGM, OR TAKING MARKETS SERIOUSLY
A. Diversity and the Marketplace Metaphor
Any attempt to formulate a new framework for First Amendment
analysis of mass media regulation must begin by considering what the
154. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,410,419-20 (1989) (holding that burning
an American flag in protest is protected expression under the First Amendment); Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22-26 (1971) (holding that protesting the Vietnam War with
profane language is protected expression); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49
(1969) (holding that a statute criminalizing the "mere advocacy" of violence is un-
constitutional).
155. See supra notes 102-16 and accompanying text.
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basic purposes and goals of the First Amendment in this area should
be. Only after identifying those policies may one consider what
mechanisms, both doctrinal and regulatory, seem most likely to
advance them. As a starting point, therefore, I should state that I
hold a frankly instrumental view of the First Amendment's speech
provisions; I believe that the primary purpose of those provisions is
to permit and advance democratic self-government, rather than to
advance individual self-actualization or autonomy. The instrumental
view of the First Amendment was prominent in the writings of
Alexander Meiklejohn, 6 and in recent years has been championed
by, among others, Professors Cass Sunstein, 7 John Hart Ely,'58
and Owen Fiss. 9 It is beyond the scope of this paper to defend my
instrumental approach,"6 but suffice to say that such a view seems
to be more consistent with the Madisonian roots of the First
Amendment, the juxtaposition of the First Amendment's Speech and
Press provisions with the Assembly and Petition provisions,' 6' and
the general structure of the Bill of Rights as a defense against
tyranny. None of which is to say, of course, that there is no First
Amendment interest in promoting autonomy and self-actualization; I
only suggest that this is not the most important goal of the First
Amendment. Further, in the area of mass media regulation, the
156. See ALEXANDER MEIKELJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948); Alexander Meikeljohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961
Sup. Cr. REV. 245 (1961).
157. SUNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 121-66; CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION
233-42, 253-56 (1993) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION].
158. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
43-72 (1980).
159. For a discussion of the two different views of the First Amendment, see Fiss, supra
note 142, at 1409-10. Professor Fiss identifies Harry Kalven, Robert Bork, and Lee
Bollinger as among those who share his instrumental approach. Id. at 1409 n.21.
Professor C. Edwin Baker is a leading modem proponent of the opposing view, that the
First Amendment should be understood primarily to promote individualistic values. See
C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-69 (1989); C. Edwin
Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 990-96
(1978); see also THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 4-7 (1966) (arguing that individual self-fulfillment through free expression
is a fundamental element of Western society). For a fascinating discussion of different
autonomy-based approaches to the First Amendment and their theoretical difficulties, see
Richard Fallon, Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875 (1994).
160. For a strong and convincing defense of an instrumental approach to First
Amendment interpretation, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 121-66; SUNSTEIN, THE
PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 157, at 231-40, 251-54.
161. The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law "abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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instrumental component of First Amendment policy must be
predominant, because of the importance of the mass media in modern
society and politics. 62
Some basic principles follow quickly from my premise. First, the
First Amendment is primarily a limitation on governmental power,
and the primary danger to which it is addressed is governmental
entrenchment facilitated by control or manipulation of public
debate."6  Second, a successful speech policy must create both
discussion and disagreement, or in Justice Brennan's words, a debate
that is "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."' '6  From these
principles follows the view'6 that the First Amendment places a
premium on encouraging a diversity of speakers who set forth a
diversity of viewpoints. As discussed above,'6 this view has driven
a substantial portion of the Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence, especially in the mass media area,67 and is also a
linchpin of the majority opinion in Turner."6 Congress also iden-
tified the advancement of diversity as an important interest served by
the Cable Act's must-carry rules. 69 The FCC has similarly stated
that one of the purposes of its Video Dialtone rules is to "foster[ the
First Amendment goal of ensuring a diversity of information sourc-
es.' ' 7 0  Finally, the academic commentary has generally been in
162. Thus even a theorist who generally favors an autonomy-based approach to speech
issues might agree that in the mass media context, where speakers tend to be major
corporations and the political consequences of speech policy are profound, an instrumental
approach is preferable.
163. Even the strongest critics of private power in speech markets agree that the First
Amendment is primarily directed against governmental abuse. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, A
New Deal for Speech, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & Err. L.L 137, 140 (1994). Of course,
private power can also pose a serious threat to free and open debate, but as I discuss in
part ll.A.2, infra, there is no nonarbitrary basis upon which the government can directly
regulate private speech. The best response to private power, therefore, is to trust
competitive speech markets to break down that power, and to adopt regulatory strategies
which foster such markets.
164. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
165. See SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 157, at 252-55; Fiss, supra
note 142, at 1411.
166. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying-text.
167. See, e.g., FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 594 (1981); FCC v.
National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978); United States v.
Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 668 n.27 (1972) (plurality opinion); Associated Press
v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
168. See Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2470.
169. See S. REP. NO. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1133, 1191; H.R. REP. No. 628, 102d Cong., 2nd Sess. 28, 63 (1992).
170. National Cable T.V. Ass'n v. FCC, 33 F.3d 66,70 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Video
Dialtone Order, supra note 10, 7 F.C.C.R. at 300, 304).
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accord, and has, if anything, argued that the Court has not sufficiently
protected the diversity interest.' 7'
Thus far, there is broad agreement. Where the difficulty arises,
and where I depart from most proponents of "diversity," is in defining
what it means to promote diversity in speakers and viewpoints. In the
mass media context especially, these concepts raise profoundly
difficult philosophical and intellectual issues. Most proponents of
diversity define the universe of relevant viewpoints, and for that
matter speakers, quite narrowly. In particular, their focus is on
explicitly political speech, directed largely at the electoral process.72
Given the profound influence that the modem mass media has in
forming and shaping our culture, including our political culture and
preferences, however, such a narrow definition is simply inadequate.
It fails to take into account the degree to which our general culture
circumscribes what we view as political, and how much the
homogeneity of that culture is itself a profoundly political result.
1. Socialization and Diverse Voices
A substantial strand of modem writing about the First
Amendment emphasizes the need for First Amendment doctrine to
focus on the political, and to advance diversity within the political
arena. Alexander Meiklejohn saw such a "political bias" as following
from his instrumental view of the First Amendment, and recently
Cass Sunstein has forcefully advanced such a position.'74 Professor
Sunstein goes well beyond most of his predecessors, however, in that
171. See supra note 89 for a summary of the academic commentary on this point.
Professor Sunstein in particular has argued strongly that an instrumental First Amendment
approach demands that the public be exposed to diverse viewpoints and that current
doctrine does not achieve that goal. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 21-23.
172. See, eg., ALEXANDER MEIKLEjOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 94 (1948) (maintaining that the First Amendment protects only "speech
which bears, directly or indirectly, upon issues with which voters have to deal-only,
therefore, to considerations of matters of public interest"); StNsTEiN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION, supra note 157, at 236-39 (explaining that the highest level of protection
under the First Amendment should be reserved for speech "when it is both intended and
received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue"); SUNSTEIN, supra note
89, at 130-37 (same); Fiss, supra note 142, at 1413 (describing that "from the perspective
of a free and open debate," the choice of entertainment programming by television
networks is "trivial"). For a similarly narrow definition of political speech by the Supreme
Court, see McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1518-19 (1995) (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976)).
173. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 172, at 94.
174. See SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTrrUTION, supra note 157, at 232-56; SUNSTEIN,
supra note 89, at 121-66.
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he advocates even positive government actions that advance political
diversity. 5 Inherent in this position is a strong view of what types
of speech are important to democratic government-in other words,
what sorts of speech are "political," in the First Amendment sense.
Professor Sunstein, for example, explicitly states that the First
Amendment should primarily value speech that contributes to
"democratic deliberation" through a process of rational argumentation
in a setting of political, though not necessarily economic, equality.'76
Professor Sunstein does not advance these views simply as his own,
but rather as the political system favored by James Madison, the
primary drafter of the First Amendment. Sunstein argues that
because of Madison's central role, Madison's views on the nature of
the political system created by the Constitution, and the role of free
speech within that system, are due substantial deference.IV
It is here that I must part with Professor Sunstein, and in general
with the view that "political speech" exists as a separate, definable
category. First, it is doubtful whether we must, or should, incorporate
the specific political theories of Madison or any of the Founding
generation into our First Amendment analysis. The text of the First
Amendment does not contain any such limitation. Also, given both
the enormous growth of this country in the past 200 years, in
population and in the scope of the electoral franchise, and the cultural
and technological changes that have accompanied this growth, the
Founders' views of politics do not seem to have much applicability to
modem America. Furthermore, and more fundamentally, we
presumably know more today than did Madison and his contem-
poraries. Two hundred years ago economics was in its infancy, and
the political theory of the liberal state was just coming into being.
Moreover, only in the twentieth century have we developed some
theoretical understanding of human psychology. Finally, the second
half of this century has witnessed the achievement of substantial
philosophical insights into the role of language and social structure in
the formation of culture and preferences. All of these things are
obviously and fundamentally relevant to a coherent theory of what
constitutes politics and what role speech plays in social governance.
My starting point, therefore, is that we take modem learning seriously
and incorporate it into our First Amendment theory.
175. SUNSTEIN, supra note 89, at xix.
176. Id at xvi-xviii.
177. Id at xvi-xvii, 121-24,132-33; SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note
157, at 20-24.
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The first casualty of modem theory is the assumption, implicit in
the writings of Meiklejohn and Sunstein, that political discourse must,
or even can, proceed at a purely rational level. The Founders,
children of the Enlightenment that they were, may well have had faith
in a rational humanity,"8 but surely after Freud and after the
cataclysmic history of this century, we are more doubtful.'79
Furthermore, philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein have
destroyed the myth of language as a neutral conduit for ideas and
have demonstrated how speech and moral understandings incorporate
enormous social and cultural assumptions."l Taken together, these
insights suggest that the manner in which political ideas are expressed,
and the force they have, is fundamentally dependent on the cultural
milieu shared by speakers and listeners. Indeed, that milieu sets limits
upon what may be said, and even what ideas can be communicated,
within the bounds of socially acceptable (or even comprehensible)
discourse.
Second, twentieth century writings in the areas of social theory
and the social sciences suggest that culture and social structure, and
178. See generally CARL L. BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS (1932) (analyzing the rationalistic world-view encapsulated in
the writings of Enlightenment philosophers).
179. For a general intellectual history of the movement towards irrationalism in
twentieth century thought, see W. WARREN WAGAR, WORLD VIEWS: A STUDY IN
COMPARATIVE HISTORY 241-65 (1977); for a discussion of the roles of Freud and modem
psychoanalysis in this movement, see id. at 153. For a discussion of the role of rationality
in the receipt of speech and its relevance for First Amendment theory, see Stanley Ingber,
The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 31-48 (arguing that
First Amendment doctrine should reflect the fact that forms of persuasion often matter as
much as the underlying message). On the limits of the idea of rationality and the need to
understand rationality within a cultural context, see Amartya Sen, Internal Consistency of
Choice, ECONOMETRICA 415, 495-521 (1993).
180. See LUDWIG WrTrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 17,10,13,37-38,
47,116,180,241-42,337-38,340 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958) (providing a basic
description of the "language-game," and its relationship to community and to thought);
WrTGENSTEIN AND LEGAL THEORY (Dennis Patterson ed., 1992) (discussing the
implications of Wittgenstein's ideas for legal theory); id. at 33-39 (setting out the core of
Wittgenstein's views on language and community, as described by Thomas Eisele); Dennis
Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance and
Enforcement under Article 9 137 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 358-69 (1988) (elucidating
Wittgenstein's views on the "grammatical nature of understanding," and discussing recent
commentary on the subject); id. at 362-63 & n.88 (concluding from Wittgenstein's
arguments that "epistemology is social" and that understanding is rooted in social
practice); see also MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 269-75 (1987)
(noting the effect of the reification of legal categories on legal doctrine); MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, LBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 147-54, 173-74, 179-83 (1982)
(discussing the primary role of the constitutive community in the identification of moral
ends).
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the process of socialization that creates and defends those basic
characteristics of our society, play a far more fundamental role in
defining the political direction of our society than does the political
discourse that is permitted within the bounds of that culture. Critical
Theory, as developed by the Frankfurt School and its postmodernist
successors,' has much to offer here. The writings of the Frankfurt
School and others compellingly demonstrate how the process of
socialization, especially in modem American culture, protects and
creates acceptance of social hierarchies and the status quo.182
Especially significant for the purposes of my analysis is Critical
Theory's critique of popular culture and the mass media, including in
particular its arguments regarding the activities of the mass media.
These arguments hold that such activities, in defining a homogeneous
popular culture, are profoundly political in nature, because culture
defines the presuppositions, the categories, and the limits of
politics."s Thus, the School decried the purported tendency of mass
culture, the "culture industry," to divert dissatisfaction and protest
into "conformity and resignation," claiming that this in itself was a
profoundly political action." 4  Under this view, the mass media
plays an essential role in inculcating, or perhaps reinforcing, basic
political values through sheer repetition of the message that the basic
181. For an excellent, general history of the Frankfurt School and Critical Theory, see
MARTIN JAY, THE DIALECTIC IMAGINATION: A HISTORY OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL
AND THE INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, 1923-1950 (1973). For a summary of the
application of Critical methodology by Critical Legal Studies scholars to legal theory, see
KELMAN, supra note 180. For a discussion of the relationship between the CLS movement
and broader Critical Theory, see id. at 9-11, 300-03 n.17.
182. See KELMAN, supra note 180, at 267-68 (discussing the defense of the concept of
"order legitimation," that is, "the spreading of the perception that the system is generally
just because each of a series of legal decisions that, when taken together, represent the
sociopolitical order is itself affirmatively justified").
183. Probably the best-known exposition of the Frankfurt School's critique of American
mass culture can be found in Herbert Marcuse's ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN (1964)
[hereinafter MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN]. See also HERBERT MARCUSE, EROS
AND CIVILIZATION (1955) (discussing the contributions of Freud); JAY, supra note 181, at
212-18 (providing a general history of the Frankfurt School and Critical Theory). Among
the major works in the Frankfurt School's analysis of mass culture identified by Jay are
(in addition to Marcuse's writings): Max Horkheimer, Art and Mass Culture, in STUDIES
IN PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE IX, 290-325 (1941); THEODOR ADORNO & MAX
HORKHEIMER, DIA LEKTIK DER AUFKLARUNG (Dialectic of the Enlightenment) (1944);
LEO LOWENTHAL, LITERATURE, POPULAR CULTURE, AND SOCIETY (1961).
184. See JAY, supra note 181, at 216-17 (citing ADORNOR & HORKHEIMER, supra note
183, at 166-87; MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN, supra note 183, at xi); see also
KELMAN, supra note 180, at 300 n.17 (relating Marcuse's views in this regard to the
Critical Legal Studies analysis of the role of legal doctrine in pacifying dissent).
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American political institutions are flawless and ideal.1' The most
important conclusion one can derive from this aspect of Critical
Theory's cultural analysis is that even if one believes that our political
system is a fundamentally sound one, there can be no doubt of the
political nature of the mass media's "cultural" and "entertainment"
offerings, which promote this message.'86
The insights of Critical Theory are especially important to the
topic of this Article because of the paramount role of the video mass
media in the socialization process. The power of video to shape
values and ideas, especially at a subrational level, cannot be underes-
timated, and it is surely not controversial at this stage to assert the
central role of television in the formation of American culture and
politics."s The central role of television in our political elections
has frequently been commented on and decried.'" Video can
transmit ideas more efficiently and effectively than any other form of
speech; and very often, the ideas are essentially political, even when
they do not purport to be.'89 Police shows certainly express a clear
viewpoint as to the appropriate roles in our society of the
185. One consequence of this role is said to be the total elimination from this country
of radical political movements with any degree of popular support, since the advent of
broadcasting. See KELMAN, supra note 180, at 300 n.17.
186. For discussions of the role of the mass media in defining the bounds of politics,
and its relevance for the First Amendment, see, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Technology,
Democracy, and the Manipulation of Consent, 93 YALE L.J. 581, 582-83 & n.7 (1984);
Ingber, supra note 179, at 38-40. On the tendency of the mass media to endorse and
inculcate incumbent values and institutions, see SHANTO IYENGAR & DONALD KINDER,
NEWS THAT MATrERS 133 (1987).
187. For a survey of the social psychology research regarding the ability of the mass
media, especially television, to socialize individuals and form attitudes, see 2 THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 571-83 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 3d
ed. 1985), and sources cited therein. See also IYENGAR & KINDER, supra note 186, at 133
(discussing mass media's ability to structure and develop ideas for popular culture);
SHANTO IYENGAR, IS ANYONE RESPONSIBLE? (1991) (questioning whether the media
accepts responsibility for the ideas it disseminates).
188. For a discussion of the role of television in eliminating discussions of policy issues
during electoral campaigns, see JAMES FISHKiN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION 63
(1991); S. ROBERT LICHTER ET AL., THE VIDEO CAMPAIGN 12, 14-15 (1988); SUNSTEIN,
supra note 89, at 59-61 (citing, among others, KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, DIRTY
POLITICS 152-80 (1992)).
189. For example, to say or write that the best way to deal with violence is to respond
with more violence does not seem to make a very convincing argument. Watching Clint
Eastwood or Arnold Schwartzenegger doing so successfully, however, over and over again,
surely does communicate some version of that idea, and with remarkable effectiveness.
I would add that whether intended by the producers or not, there is unquestionably a
strong political component to such portrayals of violence, if nothing else than as a
challenge to the belief that the best solution to urban violence is gun control.
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government, authority figures, and violence, and situation comedies
have historically expressed quite strong views on appropriate family
structure and the role of women in society. Again, these viewpoints
may well be reprehensible, but they are unquestionably political.19
The basic conclusion to draw from the political nature of the
media's cultural formation activities, perhaps counterintuitively, is that
in regulating the mass media, one must tread lightly, because any
choice to favor particular program content is, under the above
analysis, an explicitly political choice. Therefore, unless one begins
with a strong theoretical view as to the sort of society that is
constitutionally or otherwise favored, and based on this view
determines the limits that should be placed on the definition of what
is "political" and on acceptable political outcomes,' such regulatory
choices begin to appear as arbitrary, and potentially dangerous,
interference with political expression.' 2  Traditional First
Amendment analysis and the Supreme Court's existing jurisprudence
are oriented towards constraining government efforts to punish, or
prevent, criticisms of itself."s9 The dangers of governmental inter-
ference, however, can be far more subtle and insidious than that.
Influence over the mass media and the contents of popular culture
provide a slower, but ultimately far more effective, tool for
governments and governing majorities to squelch dissent and shape
190. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 142, at 1411 (stating that the Columbia Broadcasting
System (CBS) has a viewpoint that is "real, pervasive, and communicated almost endlessly
... [and] is not confined to the announced "Editorial Message," but extends to the
broadcast of Love Boat as well. In the ordinary show or commercial a view of the world
is projected, which in turn tends to define and order our options and choices.")
191. As the Critical Theorists did. See id. at 1412 & n.24 (using the specific example
of Marcuse as a Critical Theorist who is able to avoid the difficult question of what speech
belongs in "public debate" because of Marcuse's preexisting political ideology) (citing
Herbert Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 81 (1969)).
My position is, of course, open to the general critique of pluralism, advanced by modern
Critical Legal Studies theorists, that pluralism will simply permit those with power to retain
dominance. See KELMAN, supra note 180, at 247-49. However, as the following discussion
indicates, the response to this criticism seems to be that the use of the coercive powers of
the State to tilt the debate is a cure more dangerous than the illness.
192. Cf. Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4,49 (1983) (arguing
that coercing silence is "particularly problematic," because such coercion prevents the
creation of legal meaning and normative worlds). Professor Cover extends this reasoning
to conclude that coercing actions can be almost as problematic as coercing speech, but that
argument is beyond the scope of an Article on the First Amendment.
193. For discussions and critiques of the current focus of First Amendment law on
government restrictions on speech, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 5, 34-48; Fiss, supra
note 142, at 1408-10.
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opinion in particular directions.194  Absent clear and definable
guidelines on what should constitute favored speech, permitting
regulatory preferences for particular types of speech seems fraught
with risk.' 95
It is here that my disagreement with Professor Sunstein becomes
most evident. Because Sunstein starts with a strong, Madisonian view
of what is political, he is able to dismiss most of popular culture, and
in particular, most broadcast programming, as largely irrelevant to the
purposes of the First Amendment.'96 Thus, he recommends that the
FCC promote "high-quality programming, attention to public issues,
and diversity of views."'19 This approach, however, incorporates a
strong, and quite narrow, view of how political debate should proceed:
that is, through reasoned, educated, and generally moderate discourse.
This is certainly the format that television programming that is
explicitly oriented towards politics tends to follow, but favoring such
programming seems as much an act of political favoritism as the
media's general habit of limiting significant coverage to major party
candidates. Indeed, the two have much in common because they both
narrow the range of political discourse. 98 Even if the problem of
centrism can be avoided-which is unlikely-the inherent limitations
placed on the permissible forms of discourse by this view of politics
create a bias towards the mainstream. 9
194. Congress' and the FCC's recent preoccupation with the regulation of "indecent
speech" is surely an example of such attempts at homogenizing. See, e.g., S. 652, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 401 et seq. (1995) (limiting indecent speech over any "teleco-
mmunications device," including the Internet); see also Sable Communications of Cal., Inc.
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 130-31 (1989) (striking down congressional restrictions on "dial-a-
porn" services); Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT III), 58 F.3d 654, 669-70
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (upholding FCC rules limiting indecent programming on
television during certain hours). Also brought to mind are the recent statements by
Senator and presidential candidate Bob Dole, criticizing certain rap music as "nightmares
of depravity," but describing the Arnold Schwartzenegger movie "True Lies" as a "family
film." See Bernard Weinraub, Films and Recordings Threaten Nation's Character, Dole
Says, N.Y. TIMEs, June 1, 1995, at Al.
195. For a similar critique of modern efforts to regulate mass media speech, see
Thomas Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment Principles for
Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719, 1727-30, 1741 (1995).
196. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 81-88.
197. Id. at 82.
198. For example, the view of politics underlying this description of political speech
seems to leave little room for radicalism or nihilism in politics, forces that seem more
prevalent in portions of popular culture than in the political mainstream.
199. In this context, it is interesting to note that one favored tool of both Professors
Sunstein and Fiss in forcing coverage of political issues by the mass media is the FCC's
"Fairness Doctrine," which creates an obligation on the part of broadcasters to give
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The above discussion suggests a criticism of the must-carry rules
and of the decision by the Turner Court to sustain those rules, based
on the preference stated by Congress in those rules for "local"
programming over national programming. In the 1992 Cable Act,
Congress stated explicitly that it believed local programming had
special value and should be preserved, even at the expense of national
cable programming, because of its coverage of local issues.' The
Turner majority accepted this as a legitimate objective of the must-
carry rules,"° even though the dissent pointed out that Congress'
preference "for localism" was itself content-based and therefore
presumptively impermissible under the Court's jurisprudence.2°
While the dissent's analysis proceeds too quickly, its particular
conclusion in this regard seems quite correct. A preference for local
broadcasting and community-based speakers incorporates, at least to
some degree, a vision of the appropriate structure of society that is
political at heart, and therefore suspect.
All of the above highlights the critical role of the mass media in
shaping our culture and political landscape, and the dangers raised by
governmental involvement in that shaping. This conclusion, in turn,
strongly suggests that a theoretically grounded First Amendment
policy should incorporate a strong bias against governmental
preferences for particular speech, whether defined by topic, type,
content, or viewpoint. The arguments raised in favor of governmental
involvement, which presume the ability to distinguish high-value
political speech from other speech, are flawed because they define the
political realm too narrowly and fail to take account of the profoundly
adequate coverage to public issues, as well as a right of reply on political issues against
broadcasters, and which the Court sustained in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969). See SUNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 54-57; Fiss, supra note 142, at 1416, 1423.
Stanley Ingber, however, has cataloged the misuse of the Fairness Doctrine by government
and private entities to suppress disfavored viewpoints. See Ingber, supra note 179, at 57-
65. In addition, it seems at least as likely that the Fairness Doctrine has discouraged
coverage of obviously political issues by broadcasters as the idea that it has enhanced
coverage. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 142, at 1419-20. All of which suggests, again, the
perils of regulatory attempts to favor particular speech. For a general discussion of the
Fairness Doctrine, its history, and its recent vicissitudes, see Roland F. L. Hall, The
Fairness Doctrine and the First Amendment: Phoenix Rising, 45 MERCER L. REv. 705,708-
14 (1994).
200. 1992 Cable Act §§ 2(a)(10), 2(a)(11), 47 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(10), 521(a)(11).
201. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2469-70.
202. Id at 2477; see also Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 58
(D.D.C. 1993) (Williams, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress' decision was at least
partially content based), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
203. See supra notes 144-46, 172-77 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 74
1995] MASS MEDIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
political nature of the socialization process in which the mass media
is engaged. This is not to say that the government has no role to play
in this arena. The First Amendment unquestionably values diversity
among speech and speakers, and an instrumental theory of the First
Amendment should permit the government to promote such diversity.
The question that remains is what regulatory approaches the
government should adopt, and may permissibly adopt within the
strictures of the First Amendment, to advance diversity. In for-
mulating an answer, I now return to Justice Holmes's much-maligned
"marketplace of ideas" metaphor.'
2. Structural Regulation and Content
(In Defense of the Marketplace Metaphor)
As discussed earlier in this Article, 5  the current First
Amendment jurisprudence of the Supreme Court is premised heavily
upon the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor, as first articulated by
Justice Holmes, °6 and later fleshed out by Justice Brennan.' In
particular, the Court's efforts in this area exhibit a strong laissez-faire
approach to speech markets, and are directed primarily toward
protecting Professor Fiss's "street comer speaker."' '  In recent
years, however, the marketplace metaphor has come under repeated,
heavy academic attack, varying from the civic republican criticism that
the metaphor discounts the value of deliberation,' to the view that
the metaphor exaggerates the importance of discourse at the expense
of individual autonomy,210 to more radical attacks that deny the very
rationalistic assumptions that underlie the metaphor.2 ' One com-
mon feature of most of these criticisms is the claim that a
"marketplace" approach to free speech makes speech a hostage to
204. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
205. See discussion supra part I.C.
206. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
207. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301,308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
208. See Sullivan, supra note 92, at 950-51; supra note 143.
209. SUNSTEIN, supra note 89, at xviii, 24-28, 249.
210. E.g., C. Edwin Baker, Of Course, More Than Words, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1181,
1183-85, 1198 (1994). Despite my disagreement with Professor Baker's emphasis on
autonomy values in free speech theory, his concept of "cultural construction" and his
criticism of the "rational discourse" model-which he believes is a premise of the
marketplace metaphor-bear obvious parallels to my own views, as expressed earlier in
this Article. See discussion supra part II.A.1. As the following discussion indicates, where
I diverge from Professor Baker is in his assumption that a marketplace necessitates
rationality. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
211. E.g., Ingber, supra note 179, at 7.
187
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wealth and skews debate in favor of those who can afford to pay.212
These criticisms raise legitimate concerns. Nonetheless, I will argue
that the attacks on the marketplace metaphor are ultimately
misplaced, and that, especially with regard to the mass media, an
approach to speech and speech regulation modelled on economic
markets has many insights to offer for both regulatory and
constitutional policy. Moreover, and contrary to most commentators,
a market-based approach to free speech jurisprudence does not
necessitate a laissez-faire policy, hostile to all market regulation,
although it does impose constraints on acceptable regulatory
strategies.
In formulating an approach to mass media regulation, I begin
with two premises: First, because of the strong First Amendment
interest in fostering diversity of both speech and speakers,213
regulation must necessarily take into account the content of speech in
the course of creating diversity; but second, because of the theoretical
incoherence of any attempt to identify what is political, or otherwise
constitutionally "preferred" speech, and because of the further danger
that any systematic governmental favoritism between categories of
speech will permit the State to gain undue influence over the social
culture, regulation of the mass media must not favor or disfavor
speech of any particular content or even general type. The danger of
governmental control over the socialization process, in particular, is
sufficiently great and subtle, that constitutional policy must maintain
a wary mistrust of regulation that seems to skew, or even correct
existing skews in, the speech playing field.
What emerges from these two principles is a strong preference
for structural solutions to dysfunctions within media markets that
might limit diversity or otherwise fail to produce a well-functioning,
atomistic marketplace. This preference is sufficiently powerful and
well-rooted in theoretical concerns about governmental and
majoritarian misuse of regulatory power, that it should be
constitutionalized and incorporated into the First Amendment analysis
governing regulation of the mass media. A corollary to this
proposition follows: The analysis, while favoring structural ap-
proaches, should strongly disfavor regulations or administrative
mechanisms that require ongoing or case-by-case involvement by the
State in selecting the speech to be delivered through media outlets.
212. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 57-58; Fiss, supra note 142, at 1412-13; Ingber,
supra note 179, at 36-40, 71-76; The Message in the Medium, supra note 20, at 1070-71.
213. See supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text.
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Such governmental involvement is likely to provide far too many
opportunities for systematic favoritism towards viewpoints and modes
of speech within the social/cultural mainstream, and concomitantly, is
likely to lead to censorship of dissenting social views.214 Moreover,
without a strong view of what the good society looks like, there is
little theoretical justification for explicit governmental favoritism.
All of these considerations also point out why a market-based
approach to regulation remains preferable to all others, and also why
the marketplace metaphor has much to offer to constitutional analysis.
Markets remain the best way we know of to make and allocate goods
and services (or ideas, for especially in the media context these are
not separable concepts); create and nurture a wide variety among
suppliers (speakers), products (speech), and consumers (listeners); and
maximize individual autonomy, all while keeping governmental
involvement to a minimum. Thus, it seems only logical that the best
way to achieve the constitutional goals of creating as wide-open a
discourse as possible, while minimizing the risk of a skewing towards
social conformity, would be to encourage free and diversified markets
in speech.
This is also a response to the argument advanced by Professor
Sunstein against excessive reliance on markets in speech policy, based
on his belief that markets themselves reflect disguised governmental
regulation in the form of the distribution of legal entitlements.1
This may be so, but direct regulation to compensate for the distor-
tions these entitlements cause is a cure that is worse than the disease.
It can only increase favoritism and further distort the debate.
Because competition and markets do a better job than any direct
regulation in limiting private power, the better approach is to adopt
regulations that encourage the development of competitive
markets.216
214. Such censorship could take the form of favoring mainstream political views over
more radical alternatives, or more subtly, by favoring speech that is defined as political,
at the expense of more threatening attacks on the social structure. See supra note 196-99
and accompanying text. In light of these concerns, perhaps the most troubling sort of
regulatory strategy would be one that systematically favored government funded or
sponsored speech such as public television, yet such an approach is frequently espoused.
See, eg., Hawthorne & Price, supra note 33, at 510-13. Even Professor Sunstein's
approach of "promoting high-quality programming," SUNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 82,
carries the danger, it seems to me, of ensconcing the culture of the majority or the elite.
215. For an exposition of this argument in the specific context of media regulation, see
generally Sunstein, supra note 163, at 145-60 (arguing that media regulation can achieve
the desired goals).
216. For a similar view, see Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 195, at 1734-37.
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Furthermore, the concept of markets in speech has much to offer
constitutional theory. Such a model, or metaphor, should suggest
modes of analysis geared towards making speech markets more free,
diverse, and effective. A constitutional analysis involving speech
markets should take into account such explicit economic concepts as
substitutability, product definition, supply, demand, and market
concentration in assessing whether particular regulatory strategies are
likely to further First Amendment policies. The Court's current
doctrine, while purporting to be based upon a marketplace model, is
in fact entirely devoid of any sophisticated analysis of how markets
really work and how particular regulations or judicial decisions will
affect those markets. Instead, the jurisprudence simply presumes the
existence of an almost perfectly functioning market, an assumption
that is both theoretically naive, and in the media context, counter-
factual. A true market-oriented analysis can do better.
A first step in this direction is to recognize that the First
Amendment need not be read automatically to disallow, or even
discourage, regulation. That is, markets do not mandate a laissez-faire
approval. It seems almost unnecessary to point out that even in
unconcentrated, well-functioning markets in goods, there is no such
thing as true laissez-faire. All marketplace activity relies on the
existence of regulation and law, if for no other reason than to define
the rules of the market, to protect against violent dispossession, and
to enforce agreed-upon bargains.217 Many markets present sound
economic reasons for much more extensive regulation, including a
need for disclosure rules,21 prevention of anticompetitive con-
duct,2" and direct regulation of production when competitive
conditions simply will not exist.' What a market-oriented ap-
proach recommends is not hostility to all regulation, but a preference
217. For a detailed exposition of these ideas, see SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION, supra note 157, at 50-54.
218. Examples include disclosures required in the course of issuance and sale of
securities, and in the sale of food for human consumption. See Securities Act of 1933, ch.
38, § 5-10, 48 Stat. 74, 77-81 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-77j (1994)); Nutrition
Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, §§ 2(a), 3(a), 104 Stat. 2353,
2353-60 (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 343(q)-(r) (Supp. V 1993)); see also SUNSTEIN,
supra note 89, at 33 (giving examples of disclosure requirements).
219. The primary example is the antitrust laws. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-20 (1994).
220. The most common form of such regulation involves public utilities, such as the
telephone industry and the power industry. See, eg., 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-04 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993); 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-25 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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for particular kinds of regulation, based upon principles of regulatory
economics. 22'
In speech markets, however, economic principles alone cannot
answer the question of when and what kinds of regulation are
appropriate. The First Amendment imposes independent policy
considerations beyond the simple logic of efficiency. For example,
there are numerous economic markets, ,including notably most
modem consumer markets, where concentration among producers
appears to be both efficient and unproblematic.' When the market
is in speech, however, such concentration has significant political and
cultural ramifications, that are most assuredly problematic. In other
words, diversity in speech is desirable even when it may not be
efficient. Similarly, direct regulation of production by the government
(for example, of utilities) is clearly less troubling when the product at
issue is not of constitutional concern (for example, electricity), as
when such regulation might permit the government to control speech.
Thus, when difficult free speech issues are presented, a simple
economic or regulatory analysis is insufficient, and cannot replace a
more complex constitutional theory.'
Nevertheless, when considering mass media regulation, an
analytical focus on real markets, as opposed to the stylized construct
of the Court's metaphor, is useful. When a statute or rule regulating
the mass media is challenged under the First Amendment, a logical
first question is whether the regulation is even necessary, that is,
whether it is addressing a real problem. In answering that question,
an examination through an (at least somewhat) economic lens of the
speech market at issue would seem essential, because only economic
analysis will indicate whether the market being regulated is suffering
any significant failures. Any such regulation is also likely to burden
at least some speech. Thus, the second question is how great of a
burden the regulation imposes. Assessing how great that burden is,
221. For general treatments of industrial organization theory, see F.M. SCHERER, IN-
DUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (2d ed. 1980); JEAN
TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988).
222. For a brief summary and history of industrial concentration figures in the U.S.
economy, see Phillip Areeda & Louis Kaplow, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT,
CASES 794-800 (4th ed. 1988).
223. Contra Bernstein, supra note 23, at 1684-85 (arguing against regulation of cable
content because market forces will give cable operators proper incentives); Glenn B.
Manishin, An Antitrust Paradox for the 1990s: Revisiting the Role of the First Amendment
in Cable Television, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 14 (1990) (arguing that the First
Amendment has no relevance to cable regulation, because the issues involved are
ultimately ones of economic regulation only).
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however, is under current law an entirely ad hoc analysis.22" Here
too, notions of substitutability and market definition can contribute
to an understanding of whether the affected speakers and listeners
have available effective alternatives to the burdened communication.
The list goes on: Is the regulation likely to be effective? Has it
focused on a definable market? Will it improve conditions within the
market? These are all areas of concern where a market orientation
can contribute significantly to analysis and should be part of the
constitutional theory supporting that analysis.
A market-oriented theoretical approach also has some important,
substantive implications. Most importantly, a market-based approach
elevates individual preferences and choices above all other con-
siderations.' Indeed, this seems the strongest reason to embrace
the market-because it does not favor any particular world view. The
market also has some negative implications, however. In particular,
a market-based model does not, and cannot, guarantee an audience.
Structural regulation can make it easier for individuals to have access
to the market, either as speakers or consumers, and it can try to
create conditions permitting speech to be produced and sold that
might not command a very large audience, 6 but the basic need for
an audience remains. If no one, or almost no one, has any interest in
hearing particular speech, it is not likely to be produced in a
marketplace, even if the speech might seem to have important
contributions to make to debate. That, however, is the price of
agnosticism. Also, there does exist at least one response to the no-
demand problem: explicit government subsidies of unpopular
speech. m
Subsidies may also be the answer to the other potential drawback
of emphasizing market forces, which is that the right to speak, or
listen, can become too closely tied to wealth and income distribution.
Basing speech rights on the ability to pay, as markets tend to do, has
the danger of skewing the production of speech in particular
directions, probably again in favor of the status quo. For all of the
224. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
225. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 195, at 1731-33.
226. That is, regulation can seek to counteract the economies of scale that seem to exist
in media markets. The reason one might want to do this is, of course, that the need for
large audiences tends to enforce conformity and a move towards the center.
227. See infra part 1I.B.3. From the point of view of those who would favor explicitly
political speech, moreover, recent experience suggests that lack of demand may not be a
major cause of concern. The success of ventures such as CNN and C-SPAN suggests that
substantial demand exists for political and public interest oriented speech.
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reasons already discussed, however, explicit government action
designed to silence some speakers for the benefit of others seems a
particularly unattractive solution to this problem.' Subsidies, on
the other hand, do not carry with them the same risks of the
government dominating the process of cultural formation and are
largely consistent with a purely structural approach to regulation.
In sum, First Amendment theory should retain, albeit in a
somewhat modified form, a market-based model (or metaphor) of the
role of speech in our society. The theory should further incorporate
strong preferences for structural rather than command-and-control
regulation of media markets, and against policies that favor particular
speech, speakers, or categories of either. I will now turn to the
implications of these principles for First Amendment doctrine and for
mass media regulation in practice.
B. Implications for Cable Regulation
1. Doctrinal Reform
In considering the real-world implications of an until now largely
theoretical discussion, I begin with a reassessment of the Court's First
Amendment doctrine. My objectives here are modest. I do not claim
that my proposals provide an appropriate First Amendment analysis
for all areas, and I am in fact dubious whether such an all-encompass-
ing doctrine is possible (indeed, the Court's current difficulties may
be traceable to its embracing a single analysis for all free speech
cases). Instead, I limit myself to the area of mass media regulation,
and my proposals are geared very specifically to the issues that come
up in that area? 9 Within this relatively narrow but very important
area, however, one can reach some fairly definite conclusions.
First, it seems quite clear that in the area of mass media
regulation, the Court's current two-tier analysis, and in particular its
"tier-one" examination of whether a particular regulation is "justified"
with reference to regulated speech, is largely useless. As already
discussed, almost all regulation of the mass media will, at some level
228. See supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text. Professor Sunstein makes a similar
point. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 178-79.
229. Though a precise definition of the mass media is perhaps impossible, when I use
the term I generally mean the commercial dissemination of information and speech by
large, corporate or institutional speakers, to substantial numbers of listeners/consumers.
Obviously, the line between mass media regulation and other speech regulation is
sometimes a hazy one, but in most cases characterization does not seem difficult.
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of generality, be justified with reference to the content of speech,
because such regulation is generally concerned with speech, not other
issues, and speech is about content.230 Thus, the interest in diversity
is clearly about content, as are limitations on violence or indecency,
and the granting of access or reply rights. To attempt to distinguish
between such regulations based on whether or not they are justified
with reference to content therefore seems both impossible and of
limited value. This is not to say that considerations of content will
play no part in constitutional analysis, but that its role will be more
limited than its current, almost talismanic importance.
What is needed is a unitary, and far more focused, analysis that
is keyed to a precise domain-mass media regulation. In such an
analysis, a reviewing court must first ask certain critical questions.
What interests does the challenged regulation serve, and what goals
is the government pursuing? The greatest weakness of the Court's
current analysis, especially its balancing component, is the complete
absence of any limits upon permissible governmental interests
justifying regulation of speech. This absence is a direct consequence
of the necessarily ad hoc origins of the balancing test in areas where
the government has independent reasons to regulate, such as conduct
regulation or regulation of government property.23' With mass
media regulation, this is not acceptable, because the dangers of
skewing posed by unconfined government regulation far exceed any
possible gains. When the government is regulating private speech that
takes place on private property, not every justification will suffice.
While the police power (or in the case of Congress, the Commerce
Clause) generally permits governments to pursue a broad range of
interests through regulation, when the government is directly
regulating private speech, the universe of legitimate interests that can
justify such regulation should be much narrower." Instead, the first
requirement of a valid mass media regulation must be that it is
addressed to a precise and identifiable dysfunction within the
regulated market, that First Amendment policies suggest require a
regulatory response. This requirement presumes, of course, that the
230. See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
231. See supra part I.B.2.
232. As discussed supra part I.B.2, this is what distinguishes direct regulations of
speech, such as the must-carry rules at issue in Turner, from the contexts in which the
Ward/O'Brien test originated. When the government is regulating conduct, or use of its
own property, its general regulatory powers are in full play. When it is directly regulating
private speech, however, the government should not be pursuing goals that are not speech-
related.
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government can specify an economic market that is in need of
regulation. Therefore, when a mass media regulation is challenged,
if the government cannot specify a precise economic dysfunction in an
identifiable market that the regulation addresses, the courts should
automatically strike down the regulation.
Once a legitimate regulatory purpose has been identified, the
second threshold requirement of a unitary analysis must be that the
challenged regulation enacts a reasonably effective, structural solution
to the problem being addressed. For all of the reasons already
discussed, it is essential that mass media regulation operate through
the creation of neutral structures that seek to prevent the market
dysfunction from recurring, rather than involving the government in
the micro-management or ongoing supervision of speech or speakers.
In particular, any regulatory approach that permits speech to trigger
rewards, obligations, or penalties, such as the Fairness Doctrine, 3
rights of reply, or general substantive coverage obligations 35
should be immediately suspect; even in other instances, the
constitutional analysis should contain a presumption against com-
mand-and-control approaches that entirely displace existing market
structures. Rather, mass media regulation should seek to complement
existing markets, and interfere with market mechanisms only when
necessary to cure dysfunctions 36
Once the basic requirements of purpose and approach are met,
the constitutional analysis must then proceed to consider the nature
and extent of the burden on speech that the challenged regulation
imposes. In this regard, the first threshold question a court must
consider is whether the regulation has the effect of systematically
favoring particular speech or a particular category of speech. An
effects-based, rather than a purpose-based, analysis seems necessary
233. The Fairness Doctrine, when it was in existence, required broadcasters to
adequately cover public issues and present opposing viewpoints. See Hall, supra note 199,
at 705 n.1; supra note 199.
234. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
235. In theory, the Fairness Doctrine imposes an obligation on broadcasters to cover
public issues; but in practice, this aspect of the Doctrine has been essentially unenforced.
See Hall, supra note 199, at 705 n.1, 725 & n.136.
236. For example, regulation can seek to ease entry when barriers to entry exist, or it
can regulate sales under conditions of ineradicable natural monopoly. For a pragmatic
attack on command-and-control regulation, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 82-83. For a
discussion of appropriate economic regulation for new communications technologies, see
Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 195, at 1734-39.
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here 1 7 because of the great difficulty in identifying improper
purposes, especially when those purposes may be hidden in cultural
biases shared by reviewing judges."' 8 This analysis will sometimes
be quite difficult, because of the unexpected ways in which regulation
can skew markets, but it is unavoidable.39  If any systematic
preferentialism is identified, the regulation should again be
presumptively invalid.2'
Another particularly difficult issue is the question of how to treat
speaker-specific regulations. As discussed above, the recurring
problem with which the Court has struggled in assessing speaker-
based restrictions is under what circumstances such restrictions reflect
a content preference.24' No clear answer has emerged. In the area
of mass media regulation, this question is particularly important
because so much regulation does focus on particular speakers or
classes of speakers as a consequence of supply-side market con-
centration and a consequent fear of anticompetitive conduct within
the relevant markets.242 Furthermore, challenged regulations often
237. Cf. Sullivan, supra note 92, at 965 (endorsing the purpose-based approach and
result in Turner).
238. Examples of cases in which courts have failed to find an improper purpose, despite
seemingly clear legislative hostility to certain speech content, include City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (finding zoning restrictions on adult movie
theaters content neutral); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968) (finding law
banning burning of draft cards content neutral); American Library Ass'n v. Reno, 33 F.3d
78, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding special obligations imposed on producers of sexually
explicit materials content neutral), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2610 (1995).
239. Even unexpected and unintended regulatory burdens on speech should be of
concern because of the tendency of legislators to minimize the importance of, or ignore,
burdens on unpopular speech or causes. An example of such an unexpected burden might
be the alleged chilling effect of the Fairness Doctrine on political criticism. See supra note
199. For a similar approach to the problem of racially discriminatory legislation, see David
Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SuP. Cr. REV. 99, 121-22.
240. I leave open the question of whether there should be a "safety valve," paralleling
current strict scrutiny analysis, which would permit such regulation if the need is shown
to be great enough. Also, all burdens on speech need not be categorized as un-
constitutional preferentialism. Thus selective blocking technologies, such as the proposed
"V-chip" currently under consideration in Congress, are probably better characterized as
an unbundling requirement than as preferentialism, and may be upheld on that basis so
long as the burden on regulated speech is not too heavy. See Harry Edwards & Michael
Berman, Regulating Violence on Television, 89 NW. U. L. REv. 1487,1514-15, 1566 (1995).
241. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
242. Thus the must-carry rules, 1992 Cable Act §§ 4, 5, 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535, favor
broadcasters at the expense of cable operators and independent cable programmers; the
Fairness Doctrine discussed supra note 199, regulates broadcasters; the cable/telco cross-
ownership rule, 1992 Cable Act § 11, 47 U.S.C. § 533(b), regulates telephone companies;
and the right-of-reply statute struck down in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241, 258 (1974), regulated newspapers.
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place substantial burdens on the speech of regulated entities. A
solution that seems in line with the principles described above is that
speaker-based regulation should be upheld only when the regulated
entities, or classes of entities, are identified on the basis of some
neutral characteristic unrelated to their status as speakers. The choice
to single out potential speakers must be justified in the same way as
any other mass media regulation, that is, as a reasonably necessary
response to an identified market dysfunction. Furthermore, it is again
the effects of the challenged regulation rather than its motives that
must matter, and the burden must be on the government to identify
the neutral characteristics that justify regulation of the affected
persons. When a regulated class is defined by what the members say,
or by the particular type of speech with which the class is associated,
the underlying regulation will thus be presumptively un-
constitutional.243 On the other hand, when the class is defined by
some neutral criterion such as control over important physical
resources, there is no such presumption. When the link between the
statutory classification and speech is unclear, the burden must be on
the government to justify its choice of a regulated class by identifying
what non-speech characteristic shared by that class creates a need for
regulation.2
Assuming that a regulation survives all the threshold re-
quirements of constitutionality, so that it is directed at a legitimate
regulatory goal, adopts a constitutionally acceptable regulatory
approach, and does not favor particular speech or speakers, the
question remains of how its constitutionality should then be assessed.
Here, we necessarily must return to some assessment of burden and
effectiveness. Ultimately, there is no escaping some consideration by
243. Under this approach, any attempt to shape debate by favoring some speakers over
others-for example by restricting corporate speech or the speech of the wealthy-will be
presumptively unconstitutional, since such laws necessarily identify disfavored classes based
on what the government believes they will say. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58-59
(per curiam), motion to extend stay granted, 424 U.S. 936 (1976); First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,784-86 (1978). The danger that such purportedly speaker-
based regulation masks content preference is simply too great to be tolerated. Cf.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 238-39 (discussing a similar view).
244. This .is not to say that no hard cases would remain. For example, the taxation
scheme upheld in Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439,453 (1991), which applied a general
state sales tax to cable operators but not to competing satellite broadcast services or the
print media, id, at 442-43, remains difficult to classify. My guess, however, is that the case
should probably have been decided differently, because there does not seem to be any
non-speech related reason to single out cable operators among media entities. If, however,
the state had chosen not to exempt any media speakers, the tax would almost certainly be
constitutional.
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a reviewing court of these matters, unless one were to adopt a per se
rule of constitutionality, which would seem inconsistent with the
speech-protective values of the Constitution. The analysis necessary
at this stage, however, will be a great deal more focused than the ad
hoc balancing of the Court's current Ward/O'Brien analysis.245
Indeed, the primary task courts face in these cases will be relatively
straightforward-assessing how effectively the regulation achieves the
identified regulatory goal, and whether it unnecessarily burdens
speech. Thus, the courts will not be balancing utterly disparate
values. In fact, the analysis at this stage will depend entirely on the
availability of alternative regulatory strategies, because, if a chal-
lenged regulation represents the most effective and least burdensome
approach to a problem, it should almost certainly be upheld. Thus,
the issue really comes down to whether the regulating body has
ignored some other regulatory solution that is constitutionally
preferable-meaning that it is substantially less burdensome and yet
similarly effective. In this regard, I would place the burden on the
party challenging the statute or regulation to prove that a clearly
superior alternative exists. If no such alternative is identified, the
reviewing court should uphold the regulation regardless of burden or
balancing.
If, however, the First Amendment plaintiff does identify alter-
native and structural regulatory approaches to the identified problem,
the reviewing court must then engage in a relative assessment of their
burdensomeness and effectiveness.2 6 The first step would be to
determine the relative burdens on speech that each of the alternative
strategies imposes. In other words, the court must decide to what
extent each regulation makes speech significantly more difficult or
expensive, either to produce or receive, and whether it leaves open
adequate substitutes. Because we are dealing with markets, both
inquiries are basically economic, though free speech values also play
a role. The question of substitutes, in particular, should be closely
tied to economic notions of what constitute substitute products, and
not the current fiction that "all speech is equal." At the least, it
seems plain that different mediums are generally not substitutes.
Thus, if a video outlet is eliminated in a particular locality or for a
particular speaker, it is no response to say that the same message can
245. See supra part I.B.2.
246. For examples of such analysis, see Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2479-80; City
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1510 n.13 (1993); US West, Inc. v.
United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1105 (9th Cir. 1994).
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be conveyed in a newspaper or book. Indeed, even within a medium,
substitution issues may exist.247
Furthermore, significant differences in cost, either for production,
for distribution, or to the consumer, would indicate that an alternative
mode of speech is not a true substitute. Again, the analysis, to have
any meaning, must focus on the realities of the relevant market or
markets, not on the abstract question of whether "ample alternative
channels for communication" exist.2' Finally, when assessing how
burdensome a regulation is, the nature of the medium, the market,
and the regulatory approach must be taken into account. For
example, some have argued that interfering with the editorial
discretion of cable operators is less burdensome than interfering with
the editorial discretion of newspaper editors, because consumers do
not identify cable operators with the speech provided over cable
systems in the same way that newspapers are associated with the
speech they print.249 Such a claim, if empirically verified, would
certainly be relevant to a constitutional analysis of rules, such as must-
carry, which impose carriage obligations on cable operators.
Taking these principles into account, a challenging party must be
able to demonstrate the existence of an alternative regulatory strategy
that is significantly less burdensome on speech. Assuming this is
possible, the challenger must also prove that the alternative strategy
would effectively address the existing market dysfunction. Again, in
assessing these arguments the reviewing court must take into account
both economic principles and First Amendment values. The
predictive judgments necessary here are somewhat difficult, and it is
probably advisable for courts to defer to the political branches in case
of doubt.' Nonetheless, the scrutiny even at this final stage is not
247. For example, consider the difference between a prime-time slot and a 3 A.M. slot
on television.
248. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
249. See, eg., Brenner, supra note 4, at 339; Cowles, supra note 37, at 1265-69.
250. The difficulty here relates to judicial competence and the issue of deference to
legislative judgments. While the threshold requirements of constitutionality outlined above
seem well within the competence of the judiciary, the analysis required at the last stage,
requiring as it does a comparative assessment of regulatory policies, is more difficult. The
choices concerning economic regulation are generally considered to be primarily for the
legislature, and indeed, it is in the area of economic regulation that judicial deference to
legislative judgments tends to be at its greatest. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications,
Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096,2101-03 (1993); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483,487-
88 (1955). Nonetheless, when the regulation being challenged involves speech, and
particularly the mass media, substantial deference seems inappropriate given the central
role the courts play in defending free speech rights, and given that many of the dangers
to be guarded against in this area involve majoritarian abuse of power. The solution as
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completely toothless, since in at least some instances superior
regulatory approaches will exist; but it is plainly the threshold
requirements relating to purpose, structure, and neutrality that
provide the primary protection to speech in the above-described
analysis.
2. Some Reassessments and Proposals
In the previous section, I set forth the major outlines of a
constitutional doctrine appropriate for First Amendment review of
mass media regulation. I now turn to the implications of this analysis
for the must-carry rules and for cable regulation in general.
The analysis outlined above strongly suggests that the Supreme
Court decided Turner incorrectly by upholding the 1992 Cable Act's
must-carry rules as at least potentially constitutional. 1 My analysis
suggests a number of constitutional problems with must-carry. Most
importantly, the rules are not neutral among different categories of
speech. As Justice O'Connor's Turner dissent, as well as Judge
Williams's dissent in the District Court, point out, the must-carry rules
are designed systematically to favor speech of a particular content.
That is, the rules favor speech that is "local" in origin and give
disproportionate coverage to local issues and points of view. 2
Justice O'Connor's argument seems irrefutable on this point and is
sufficient to condemn the must-carry rules as vehicles for an imper-
missible political preference on the part of Congress.23 This is true
even though, contrary to Justice O'Connor's dissent, the broader goal
to which the rules are directed-increasing the diversity of speakers
on cable television--is perfectly legitimate. However admirable
the goal, the means chosen by Congress in sections four and five of
the 1992 Cable Act do not pass constitutional muster. Rather than
creating structural mechanisms to address the competitive problems
that Congress found in the cable industry, the rules interfere directly
with market choices by coercing the carriage, and therefore the con-
sumption, of particular speech.
to the correct degree of deference is, however, not obvious, and a full consideration of
these issues is beyond the scope of this Article.
251. See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
252. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2476 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 58 (D.D.C.
1993) (Williams, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
253. See supra part II.A.1.
254. See 1992 Cable Act § 2(a)(6), 47 U.S.C. § 521; Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at
2469-70.
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In fact, the must-carry rules should have been struck down even
if there had been no indication that the speech favored by the rules
contained systematically different content than the disfavored speech,
though that would be a closer case. The reason for this conclusion is
that regulatory means existed to achieve Congress' ultimate end of
preserving low-income access to video programming that are less
burdensome on speech and that interfere less with market
mechanisms than must-carry. There may be many such mechanisms,
of course, but the most obvious are direct subsidies, either to
encourage broadcasters to stay on the air, or to low-income or high-
cost consumers to permit them to subscribe to cable.' 5  Such a
strategy is obviously less burdensome on speech and yet seems equally
or more effective in preserving long-term access to programming.
Indeed, subsidies generally have the virtue of burdening almost no
speech, while directly advancing their intended ends. For these
reasons, the must-carry rules would fail constitutional scrutiny under
a burden/effectiveness analysis, as well as under the threshold rules
forbidding favoritism. s6
On the other hand, my analysis suggests that the cable/telco
cross-ownership provision of § 533(b) s7 probably should be held
constitutional, and therefore that the judicial decisions striking down
the rule are wrongly decided. 8  In passing the cross-ownership
255. Lest there be some objection that cable service is not the sort of "essential" service
that should be subsidized, I would point out that as a society we have heavily subsidized
access to telephone services, and the role of cable in our social and political system today
seems at least as important as the telephone-even before video services become truly
interactive. Of course, subsidies raise issues of control over the public fisc, but as I will
discuss, there are ways to cross-subsidize the receipt of network services such as cable that
have little or no direct budgetary impact.
256. Contrary to arguments presented in Turner, see 114 S. Ct. at 2466-69, however, the
must-carry rules are not impermissibly speaker-based. Even though the must-carry rules
impose burdens on a class of speakers (cable programmers) and grant concomitant benefits
to another class of speakers (broadcasters) it is not true that the regulated classes are
identifiable only by the nature of their speech. Rather, Congress appears to have relied
upon a neutral criteria in choosing to favor broadcasters-their mode of transmission. In
particular, Congress favored broadcasters because their transmission structure provides
speech without charge to consumers. See 1992 Cable Act § 2(a)(12), 47 U.S.C. § 521;
Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2469-70. This seems a speech-neutral criteria associated
with a legitimate regulatory goal-subsidizing the consumption of speech by those who
cannot afford to pay cable fees.
257. 1984 Cable Act, Pub. L. No. 98-549, sec. 2, § 613, 98 Stat. 2779, 2785 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (Supp. V 1993)).
258. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181,203 (4th Cir. 1994),
aff'g 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 2608 (1995); US West v.
United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir. 1994); Southern New England Tel. Co. v.
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prohibition, Congress identified what appears to be a legitimate
competitive problem it was seeking to address-the possible misuse
by telcos of their already existing wireline monopoly to gain control
over cable, and the resulting threat that a single entity might end up
with control over all wired access to the home. 9 In addition,
§ 533(b) is a structural regulation that addresses a potential market
dysfunction while minimizing ongoing regulatory supervision.
Furthermore, § 533(b) quite clearly is not designed systematically to
favor or disfavor any particular speech. The statute prohibits
participation only by a particular class of entities, local telephone
companies, in the very specific economic market of video program-
uing, and applies only within the telcos' service areas.26° Despite
its seemingly content-based language,261 moreover, the statute does
not favor any particular speech; rather, it regulates a particular
product market. Finally, the burdened regulatory class is identified
not because of its speech, but based on a thoroughly neutral
criteria-the class members' status as monopoly providers of local
telephone service.262
Thus, the cable/telco ban appears at least facially unproblematic.
The analysis is complicated, however, by historical developments and
technological changes since the passage of the cross-ownership bar,
which have arguably rendered § 533(b) outmoded. It has been argued
that the enormous growth of cable over the past ten years makes any
threat of anticompetitive conduct illusory, and that modern tech-
nology permits telcos to provide consumers video services over their
own existing lines that would compete with existing cable operators,
thereby ameliorating rather than creating market dysfunctions 2 6
Thus, Congress has no legitimate remaining interest in preventing
telco entry into this market. It has also been argued that § 533(b) is
United States, 886 F. Supp. 211,219-20 (D. Conn. 1995); Ameritech Corp. v. United States,
867 F. Supp. 721, 737 (N.D. Ill. 1994); BellSouth v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335, 1344
(N.D. Ala. 1994).
259. See H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4692; Video Dialtone Order, supra note 10, 7 F.C.C.R. at 5781, 5848;
Chesapeake & Potomac TeL Co., 42 F.3d at 195.
260. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b).
261. The apparently content-based distinction occurs in the statute's definition of video
programming. See supra note 43.
262. See Video Dialtone Order, supra note 10, 322.
263. See Video Dialtone Order, supra note 10, 5841-43 (summarizing comments to this
effect submitted to the FCC); id at 5848-50 (FCC reaching the same conclusion).
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overbroad because numerous, less burdensome regulatory strategies
exist to achieve Congress' ends, assuming that they are legitimate.264
These arguments are not trivial and provide substantial support
for the decisions striking down the cross-ownership ban.2  The
difficulty with them is that substantial uncertainty remains, which the
telcos have not been able to dispel, regarding the factual predicates
of their obsolescence argument. There is uncertainty especially over
the economic feasibility of telcos providing video over their existing
networks, and the effectiveness of alternative regulatory approaches
that would permit telco entry. Therefore, because telcos bear the
burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a facially valid
statute, it seems preferable that, at least for the present, courts defer
to Congress and the FCC, rather than enter into the fray at a
constitutional level. This conclusion does not preclude the possibility
that if after some time Congress fails to act, and the factual situation
becomes clearer, the courts may be forced to reexamine § 533(b).
Until now, I have discussed familiar, previously tested regulatory
schemes. There are, however, other approaches to cable regulation
that have been proposed or implemented in recent years and that also
require some discussion. Probably the most controversial set of
proposals involve imposing common carrier obligations, based on the
model of current telephone service, on cable operators.' Such a
system would require cable operators to carry programming by
anyone who requested carriage, on a first-come, first-served basis, and
charge only non-discriminatory prices. 67 Two questions arise when
considering such a proposal. Is it constitutional, and is it sound
regulatory policy? Under my approach, the two questions are
264. See Chesapeake & Potomac TeL Co., 42 F.3d at 200-02; US West, 48 F.3d at 1104-
06.
265. Indeed, it would seem that any congressional policy that seeks to enhance
competition in relevant markets, for example by encouraging the development of
alternative transmission networks, should be presumptively constitutional, while any policy
that inhibits competition should be presumptively unconstitutional, absent a strong
justification.
266. For examples of such proposals, see Carter, supra note 186, at 597 (describing a
partial common-carrier model proposed by Ithiel de Sola Pool); Olcott, supra note 29, at
1593 (proposing a statutory solution based on a video common carrier structure, employing
a programming subsidiary requirement); The Message in the Medium, supra note 20, at
1090 (proposing that operators treated as common carriers make transmission services
available to the public on a nondiscriminatory basis, thus exercising fewer editorial
discretions than today's media operators).
267. See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-203 (1988 & Supp. V
1993) (describing current obligations of telecommunications common carriers); Olcott,
supra note 29, at 1593-1604 (describing proposed common carrier rules).
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necessarily interrelated.2" As to constitutionality, the primary
problem posed by a common carrier obligation is the burden it would
place upon the editorial discretion of cable operators to choose what
programming to carry-indeed, a common carrier regime would
eliminate any such editorial discretion. This, however, is a burden
issue, not a threshold problem. A common carrier regime, by
definition, does not favor any particular speech or speakers and does
not involve the government in directing the production or con-
sumption of speech-products. And while such a statute would impose
special burdens on persons who control video transmission facilities,
this is a regulated class that is identified not on the basis of speech,
but because of members' control over particular, physical facilities.
Finally, the regulatory goals of a common carrier statute are entirely
legitimate, since the primary purpose of common carrier regimes is to
eliminate the discrimination and anticompetitive conduct that can
arise when a monopoly exists over some essential facility (here,
transmission capacity). A common carrier statute is indeed an almost
archetypal example of a structural solution to an existing market
dysfunction.
The burden/effectiveness analysis, however, is more complicated.
On the one hand, the burden that a common carrier statute imposes
does not seem terribly great. While it is true that such a regime
severely limits the editorial discretion of cable operators, for reasons
discussed above,.69 that is not in itself terribly troublesome. Given
the peculiar technological characteristics of cable, it seems unlikely
that cable operators themselves feel a strong association with
programming they choose to carry,270 and it seems equally unlikely
that consumers tend to identify the operator with carried program-
ming.
On the other hand, it is not clear that a common carrier regime
is a particularly effective solution to the competitive problems in the
cable industry, suggesting that constitutionally preferable approaches
may exist. Because of the limited capacity of cable systems,27 it is
268. For the purpose of this discussion, I assume that there is no bar to the cable
operator owning or controlling some of the carried programming, so long as it does not
discriminate in favor of its own programming.
269. See supra note 249.
270. This is because most operators are not even aware of the specific programming
being carried at a particular time. See Brenner, supra note 4, at 380-81.
271. See supra note 21. These capacity limits seem likely to persist for at least the near
future, despite the widespread rhetoric regarding the brave new world of 500-channel
capacity. See Olcott, supra note 29, at 1569-70; Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What
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impossible to grant carriage to all who request it. 2  Some allocation
mechanism is therefore necessary. What is most commonly proposed
is a first-come, first-served regime, but such a system would be
difficult to enforce. In particular, if an operator has an incentive to
discriminate in favor of affiliated programmers, surely it will seek to
bypass the rule by ensuring that such programmers are first in line.
Also, enforcement of nondiscrimination rules requires exactly the sort
of ongoing and probably quixotic governmental involvement that
should be disfavored in mass media regulation.27 Thus, a court
assessing such a scheme would face the unusual situation of a statute
that imposes relatively minor burdens on speech, but is perhaps not
terribly effective. In this situation, the lack of a substantial burden,
and the difficulty of identifying clearly superior regulatory strategies
that are less burdensome, are sufficient to counsel a finding of
constitutionality, especially when one considers the preference for
deferring to the policy judgment of the elected branches. One related
point: The current regulatory regime already incorporates a version
of common carrier regulation in its leased access requirements. 4
Leased access, however, imposes a lesser burden on cable operators,
since it leaves operators with control over some of their capacity. As
such, if common carrier regimes are constitutional, leased access is a
fortiori constitutional. 2 75
A regulatory approach closely related to the common carrier
propositions described above, and one that is in fact in consideration
both in Congress and the FCC, is to impose restrictions on vertical
integration within the cable industry by prohibiting or restricting
It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1831 (1995).
272. This is in contrast to the telephone system, where capacity does not significantly
limit access.
273. Of course, even absent the capacity problem, any common carrier regime
necessitates some ongoing official supervision in setting rates and ensuring that rates
actually charged are nondiscriminatory.
274. 1992 Cable Act §§ 9, 10(a)-(b), 47 U.S.C. § 532.
275. Another drawback of a common carrier scheme is that it may not accurately
reflect the financial structure of the cable industry. For reasons already discussed, the
cable industry today is organized so that cable operators pay for access to programming
and then pass on the charges to consumers as subscription fees. See supra notes 16-17 and
accompanying text. There is no direct mechanism for programmers to bill consumers, and
it is not clear that a workable billing mechanism could be easily created. Brenner, supra
note 4, at 382, makes this point in reference to leased access. The common carrier,
however, might be required to provide billing services as part of its transmission service,
so this problem is probably not insurmountable.
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affiliations between cable operators and programmers.2 76  Such
restrictions could either be imposed in conjunction with common
carrier regulation, or on their own. As a preliminary matter, restric-
tions on vertical integration do not appear to run afoul of any of the
threshold requirements I have set forth, for much the same reasons
that common carrier regulation does not.2' The regulatory interest
that a vertical integration bar would serve-preventing discrimination
in favor of affiliated programmers by those controlling transmis-
sion-is an extremely strong one. This is so because such
discrimination appears to be a persistent competitive problem, which
is permitted by cable operators' control over essential transmission
facilities, and which creates a substantial barrier to a well-functioning
market between programmers and consumers.278  Vertical in-
tegration restraints are also, like a common carrier regime, structural
regulations that do not target any particular speech. Finally, while the
speech of a particular class of entities is burdened, as with common
carrier regulation that class-those controlling transmission
facilities-is neutrally defined.279
The burden that a ban on vertical integration would impose on
the regulated class is, however, quite severe, since it would entirely
prevent cable operators from speaking over their own systems.
Furthermore, since at present such facilities are almost all monopolies,
and because there are no true substitutes for the video medium, a
total ban would leave no equivalent means for cable operators to
speak, at least to their subscribers.' On the other hand, effective
276. See 1992 Cable Act § 11(c), 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(C) (requiring the FCC to
consider limiting vertical integration); Horizontal and Vertical Ownership Limits, supra
note 62, at 8607-08 (declining for the present to adopt such restrictions).
277. See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
278. A related argument that is made in favor of vertical integration restrictions is that
cable operators can use control over programming to foreclose competition in transmis-
sion, by denying access to necessary programming. See 1992 Cable Act § 2(a)(5), 47
U.S.C. § 521 (congressional finding that this is a concern); Id § 19, 47 U.S.C. § 548
(mandating FCC regulations to combat such abuses by programmers affiliated with cable
operators). This argument, however, rests on the unproven (and facially unlikely)
proposition that significant entry barriers exist in the programming market so that access
to some particular programming is essential to creating a successful competitor to a cable
operator. Absent evidence that this is true, the foreclosure argument does not seem to
provide additional support for a vertical integration ban.
279. Restrictions on vertical integration do not burden the speech of programmers
because the activity in which they are forbidden to engage, transmission, is not in any
meaningful sense speech.
280. Broadcasting is not necessarily an option, because a separate cross-ownership
provision makes it unlawful for persons owning broadcast station licenses to become cable
operators, if the broadcast area of the station covers any portion of the community served
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regulatory alternatives are not immediately apparent, since the
historical experiences' shows that antidiscrimination rules are
difficult to enforce when an incentive to discriminate on the part of
the owner of an essential facility remains in place. The government
does, however, appear to have at least one regulatory alternative that
is substantially less burdensome than a flat ban on vertical integration:
It might restrict a cable operator's carriage of affiliated programming
to a specified percentage of its channel capacity at any one time.'
Such a strategy would seem to achieve most of the objectives of a flat
ban without imposing nearly as severe a burden on the cable
operator's speech. For these reasons, a flat ban on vertical integration
should probably be struck down, while a reasonable restriction on
how much affiliated programming an operator is permitted to carry
would quite clearly be constitutional.
Finally, I come to the issue of subsidies, government-financing,
and direct governmental involvement in media marketplaces. One of
the persistent criticisms of the current, market-driven approach to free
speech rights is that markets favor the speech and listening rights of
the wealthy, thereby skewing public debate.' Most proposed
solutions, however, involve the squelching of some speech, or
speakers, in order to permit favored speakers to be heard; but for
reasons already discussed, the dangers of censorship and ideological
preferentialism raised by such approaches seem -to far exceed the
gains.' A better solution, and one that, in my view, should be
constitutionally preferred, is to subsidize those perceived to be
slighted by the marketplace. On the demand side, the most obvious
way to do this is to subsidize the access of low-income people to
speech markets, most obviously in the cable context, by subsidizing
by the operator's cable system. See 1984 Cable Act § 2, 47 U.S.C. § 533(a)(1).
281. I refer to the telephone industry, and in particular to the events leading up to the
breakup of the Bell System, when MCI and other long distance carriers complained that
AT&T and the Bell System used their control over essential local networks to discriminate
in favor of their own long distance service. See generally United States v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131,160-63 (D.D.C. 1982) (summarizing evidence that AT&T had
monopolized the telecommunications market in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act),
aff'd sub nom, Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
282. The FCC has in fact adopted such a restriction, on the instructions of Congress in
the 1992 Cable Act. Under current rules, a cable operator may occupy only 40% of its
channels with video programming produced by a programmer affiliated with the cable
operator. See Horizontal and Vertical Ownership Limits, supra note 62, at 8583-96.
283. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 191-95, 213-14 and accompanying text.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
subscription charges.' Such a policy is likely to strengthen the
demand for diversified programming and therefore produce more
diverse speech through market mechanisms, all without the need for
any explicit preferentialism by the government. The only question
that arises is whether these subsidies should be financed out of
general revenues, or through charges imposed on wealthier con-
sumers. 86 The first is probably preferable, since it is more neutral
in its application and does not burden listeners as such; but even a
more explicit cross-subsidizing approach would probably be accep-
table, so long as the financial burden imposed on individual con-
sumers is slight.
3. The Difficult Case of Government-Funded Speech
The other form of subsidy available to the government is on the
supply side, through funding the production of programming in order
to increase diversity, or to favor particular ideological positions.
While facially similar to consumption-side subsidies, government
funding of speech raises far more difficult constitutional and policy
questions, and therefore requires more extended treatment here.
The first funding strategy that the government could adopt would
be to provide funding' to anyone creating new video programming,
regardless of the content of the programming. If funding were
limited, it would be distributed on some neutral basis, such as a first-
come, first-served scheme.'- The purpose of such a policy would
be to permit the creation of programming that might not have a large
commercial market-perhaps because those who would wish to view
such programming are few or poor-and thereby increase diversity
285. The availability of this regulatory strategy is of course one of the reasons why I
conclude that the must-carry rules should be found unconstitutional.
286. Or equivalently, one could require cable operators to set up rate structures that
cross-subsidize among consumers, much as is done with local telephone service.
287. Or alternatively, the government could provide tax breaks. Cf. Regan v. Taxation
With Representation, 461 U.S. 540,549-51 (1983) (holding that § 501(c)(3) of The Internal
Revenue Code, which grants a tax exemption only to certain nonprofit organizations "no
substantial part of the activities of which" engages in lobbying or attempts to influence
legislation, neither violates the First or Fifth Amendments nor regulates any First
Amendment activity).
288. Professor Carter has advanced a somewhat similar idea in proposing that the
government itself establish (1) a broadcast or cable network with independent editorial
discretion and (2) common carrier broadcast and cable stations on which programming
slots would be distributed by lottery. Carter, supra note 186, at 606. The latter approach
strikes me as a viable solution, but the former does not-I am dubious about the ability
of a publicly-owned network to be insulated from political pressure to stick to the
ideological and cultural mainstream.
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within the supply of available programming. Any such funding policy
seems entirely unproblematic constitutionally, since it does not
directly burden any speech or speakers, nor does it favor any
particular type of speech, and seems otherwise highly desirable.
Unfortunately, if recent experience with arts funding is any in-
dicator' 9 the ability of the government to maintain neutrality
within such a program is doubtful, especially when the funded
programs begin to challenge widely accepted moral beliefs or
important cultural shibboleths. Of course, such programming is just
the sort that is likely to be in need of independent funding, since it is
unlikely to create much market demand.
Another issue is the permissibility of government funding that is
not neutral, and that limits its support, on a systematic basis, to par-
ticular, favored content or viewpoints. Selective funding of speech by
the government remains a topic of ongoing controversy on which
views vary sharply, and sometimes unpredictably.2 °  On the one
hand, it has been plausibly argued that selective funding is not only
permissible, but is positively desirable as a means to "enrich public
debate" through the funding of public-oriented or high-quality
speech.29 In fact, the current funding of public television and radio
by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting is probably best viewed
289. I refer to the recent efforts to eliminate federal funding for the National
Endowment for the Arts (NEA), which seems to have been based at least in part on
hostility to the contents of the speech funded by the NEA. See SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION, supra note 157, at 308-13. Jacqueline Trescott, House Vote Set to Abolish
Arts Endowment, WASHINGTON POST, July 18, 1995, at C1.
290. The current constitutional status of selective funding is far from clear. The
constitutionality of content and viewpoint discrimination in funding seemed clearly
established in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct.
1759, 1764 (1991), in which the Court upheld the so-called "gag rule" prohibiting clinics
from using federal funds to provide abortion-related services including medical advice.
More recently, however, in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115
S. Ct. 2510,2518-20 (1995), the Court struck down what it found to be a viewpoint-based
restriction on the funding of student publications by the University of Virginia, while
acknowledging that content-based restrictions may be permissible. The Court purported
to distinguish Rust on the grounds that Rust involved the government's own speech rather
than a government program to fund private speech. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518-19.
Thus, the government had the right to control its own speech, but not the private speech
of individuals who received government funding. I am doubtful, however, whether the two
situations are so easily distinguishable. See id. at 2548 nn.11-12 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(recognizing the difficulty of distinguishing between government-fimded, but private,
speech and the government's own speech spoken by private individuals whom the
government pays specifically to do so, and leaving open the question of constitutionality
of viewpoint-based discrimination in government funding).
291. See, e.g., SUNSTMIN, supra note 89, at 84, 88; Fiss, supra note 142, at 1415.
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as just such an effort.2' On the other hand, selective funding has
also been widely and sharply attacked.2" In particular, Professor
Sunstein has argued that permitting unconstrained viewpoint
discrimination in funding decisions is extremely problematic because
of its skewing effect on the public debate, and that therefore such
discrimination should be permitted only as part of discrete and limited
programs, and only so long as the discrimination does not involve
taking sides in current political debates.294
The above analysis suggests, however, that discriminatory
funding, while perhaps not particularly desirable, is not un-
constitutional, and is also largely unavoidable.295 An approach to
speech issues that continues to place great reliance on market forces
suggests that one can draw a distinction between the government as
regulator and the government as market participant, and that actions
taken in the latter role generally provide less cause for concern, since
292. Despite the purported independence of public broadcasting, it seems plain that
public broadcasting is intended to provide programming with a very particular view of
culture and politics-one that is moderate and traditional. The cultural programming
tends to be favored by the elite and the political coverage tends to be informed and
thoughtful, but rarely radical. See Walter Goodman, If PBS and Newt Gingrich Go Head
to Head, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1994, at Cl. None of this is necessarily bad, but public
broadcasting does contain strong and predictable content-based biases and is in no way an
outlet for speech outside the mainstream.
293. See, eg., Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2055
n.212 (1994) (criticizing the Court in Rust for treating government funding of private
speech in abortion clinics as government speech, and arguing, by analogy to the Court's
public forum doctrine, that viewpoint discrimination in government funding should be
unconstitutional).
294. SUNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 114-18, 226-34; SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITLION, supra note 157, at 308-15. Interestingly, however, Professor Sunstein does
not appear to believe that public broadcasting violates this principle; probably because his
definition of what constitutes viewpoint discrimination seems narrower than mine. See
SUNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 231-32.
295. Obviously, this conclusion is in some tension with the Court's recent decision in
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510,2518-20 (1995). As
already discussed, however, I have some doubts about whether Rosenberger is consistent
with existing law, including especially the Rust decision. See supra note 290. Moreover,
the result in Rosenberger may be explained by the nature of the speech that the University
of Virginia refused to fund, which consisted entirely of publications that "primarily
promot[e] or manifes[t] a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality." 115
S. Ct. at 2520. In other words, the prohibition at issue also raised substantial Free
Exercise Clause concerns. As a predictive matter, one wonders if the Court would extend
its holding to prohibit the government from refusing to fund pornographic or racist speech.
Butsee SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 157, at 312-13 (suggesting that
a broad ban on funding profanity or sexually explicit speech should be unconstitutional).
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they do not displace market mechanisms.96 Moreover, if one
accepts that a sphere of "political" speech cannot be identified and
isolated from other speech, any preferentialism in funding is
problematic. But once discrimination is viewed as broadly as it
should be,' it seems inevitable that public funding decisions will be
discriminatory in the sense that all, or almost all, government-funded
speech is likely to express a view of culture and society that is
moderate and majoritarian. It is simply unrealistic to expect
otherwise, and constitutional theory should accept that reality.298 In
addition, it is not clear that sound democratic theory requires the
majority to subsidize speech that expresses a view of society or culture
that the majority finds abhorrent. 99  Finally, since under my
constitutional approach selective funding is perhaps the only way for
the electoral majority to express support for a particular viewpoint or
a particular vision of society, it seems all the more important to keep
such a safety valve open.
One concern that discriminatory funding decisions raise is the
"drowning out" problem. Given the enormous size and financial clout
of the government in modern society, it is possible that permitting the
government to take sides in cultural and political debates will permit
it to control the debate by drowning out other perspectives and
speakers through the sheer volume of its speech. This is not a trivial
argument, and if such an eventuality were to occur, one could argue
that the government had stepped over the line from simply par-
ticipating to interfering with the market. It is doubtful, however, that
this would happen in regard to most topics. Given the enormous
volume of speech produced and sold in this country, and the
apparently insatiable market demand for such speech, especially video
programming, it seems beyond the capacity of even the government
to control debate purely through its purchasing power.
For these reasons, selective government funding should not be
invalidated. Tolerance of such preferentialism, however, has some
296. This is a distinction with which Professor Sunstein sharply disagrees. See
SUNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 117.
297. See supra, part II.A.1.
298. As discussed above, the activities of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting seem
to be a case study in this phenomenon.
299. Of course, any funding involves some such coercion since some taxpayer, probably
one with atypcial views, is likely to disagree with the message of the speech funded, but
since there is no Establishment Clause for speech, I doubt if this has constitutional
implications. Cf Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2520-25 (upholding state funding of a religious
publication against an Establishment Clause challenge).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
clear implications for First Amendment policy. Since discriminatory
funding can only increase the ability of the government, and generally
of the majority, to instill its view of the good society as part of the
general cultural understanding, it is especially important to create
structures that will permit some dissent to be heard, and it is equally
important that courts remain vigilant to ensure that the State does not
squelch those views.
C. Extrapolations: Other Mass Media
In the discussion above, I have dealt primarily with regulation of
the cable industry to illustrate how my proposed constitutional
analysis would work. There are at least two reasons for this focus.
First, because my consideration of these issues was sparked by the
Turner decision, cable seemed the logical place to focus; but second,
the regulation of cable and video is currently the central source of
First Amendment mass media issues, and it seems apparent that the
importance of cable and wireline video can only increase in the
future. Cable is already the primary source of video programming for
Americans, and over time it is likely to become even more so as
interactive video services are developed by the industry, or by
competitors such as telcos. Nonetheless, a short discussion of how
these ideas might play out in other mass media contexts is necessary.
I begin with the original mass media, newspapers. Here, my
theory generally supports the Court's strongly laissez-faire approach
to regulation.3° First, of course, content and speaker preferences
of any sort should be immediately suspect. More fundamentally,
because concentration within the newspaper industry is a consequence
of economies of scale only-because there are few physical restric-
tions on competition-government regulations aimed at curing market
imperfections are likely to be burdensome, ineffectual, and, therefore
probably unconstitutional. Newspapers are simply not a market that
seems susceptible to effective structural regulation. In addition,
because of the close association that exists between newspaper editors
and the contents of what they publish, even imposing carriage
300. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 195, at 1721-24, for a description of the
Court's strong resistance to regulation of the print media, and the contrast between that
approach and the Court's approach to the broadcast media. See also Fred H. Cate, The
First Amendment and the National Information Infrastructure, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1, 9-18 (1995) (discussing the resistance to regulation of print media).
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requirements on newspapers301 is extremely burdensome. This
burden is sufficiently great that, in my view, courts should almost
always strike down such requirements. Finally, a laissez-faire policy
towards newspapers does not seem particularly troublesome because
reasonably close substitutes are far more easily found for publication
in daily circulation newspapers-for example, publication in weekly
news magazines, or for that matter, private pamphleteering-than for
video. °2
Broadcasting, on the other hand, raises issues more similar to
cable than to the print media. Given limitations on the available
electromagnetic spectrum, physical scarcity is obviously a serious issue
for broadcast, and some governmental regulation seems essential even
if that regulation consists simply of enforcing ownership rights to the
spectrum. My basic objections to regulatory preferences for particular
types of speech-and for that matter any censorial power by the
government-stand, especially given the central position occupied by
television in our culture. What this suggests is that most of the FCC's
current regulation of broadcasting is unconstitutional. This includes,
in particular, its review of the content of programming in the course
of granting or renewing broadcast licenses,33 its restrictions on
indecency in broadcasting,3' and the Fairness Doctrine."' On the
other hand, carriage requirements, such as an obligation to sell time
slots, or even true common carrier regulation, would probably be
301. One example of such a requirement would be the right-of-reply statute struck
down in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,244-45 (1974). Right-of-
reply provisions are, of course, especially questionable because they are triggered by
speech with a particular content.
302. But cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 107-13 (arguing that newspapers should be
treated similarly to broadcasters, because of the fact that daily circulation newspapers tend
to be monopolies). What I think Professor Sunstein ignores is that publication in the New
York Times is valuable at least as much due to the imprimatur added by publication in the
New York Times as it is due to the audience reached by its circulation.
303. This review occurs pursuant to the "public interest" standard of 47 U.S.C. § 309(a).
See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969); National Broadcasting
Corp. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
304. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Action for Children's Television
v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Act III) (en bane). For the same reasons as
those stated in note 240, supra, however, a selective blocking system for indecent
programming seems unproblematic.
305. See supra note 199. The Fairness Doctrine would be unconstitutional because by
requiring coverage of public issues, it would place explicitly political speech-in the narrow
sense of speech regarding the political process-in a preferred position. See SUNSTEIN,
supra note 89, at 48, 54-55. The FCC has purported to extend elements of the Fairness
Doctrine to cable television, though enforcement appears to be very limited. See 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.205 (1994).
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permissible, for essentially the same reasons that common carrier and
leased access regulations are permissible in the cable context. 06
Within these guidelines, the government should probably have quite
a bit of discretion as to the mechanism it chooses to allocate airwave
space; but that mechanism would likely be quite different from the
one in use today. I would conclude by noting that the above
discussion, at least as applied to television, may be largely moot if the
current trend towards the displacement of broadcast television by
cable continues, especially because cable does not have nearly as
limited a capacity as the airwaves.
Finally, I come to the future: the Internet, and the eventual
broadband" 7 information superhighway, or infobahn.3 °8 To begin
with, it is not clear that these media even fall within the scope of my
analysis, since they may be better characterized as systems for private
communications, more analogous to the telephone system than to
mass media, where a single speaker reaches a mass audience. The
reality is, however, that these media share characteristics of both.
First and foremost, any flat regulation of content-that is, of
particular types of speech-on these media is of course entirely
impermissible.3" Indeed, it seems even more important to ensure
neutrality in the regulation of these communications media than with
the current mass media. This is because private, or semi-private,
communications on these media are likely to play an even more
important role than the mass media in challenging, or alternatively in
ensconcing, mainstream cultural values. 310
On the other hand, carriage and access requirements, including
especially some variation on common carrier regulation of privately-
306. See supra notes 266-75 and accompanying text.
307. By "broadband," I mean having a transmission system, likely made up of fiber
optic cables, that has a very high capacity and is video-capable. See Volokh, supra note
271, at 1806 n.3; The Message in the Medium, supra note 20, at 1067.
308. For the origins of the term "infobahn," see Volokh, supra note 253, at 1806 n.4.
309. See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
310. See Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129-31 (1989) (holding
that a total ban on indecent phone messages provided by private dial-in telephone services
violates the First Amendment, because the total denial of adult access far exceeds that
which is necessary to prevent access by minors). Here, the analogy to telephone is
probably a good one, since the telephone system, like the infobahn, permits large amounts
of private, interactive, person-to-person communications. The difference is that the
Internet also permits, and the infobahn will presumably permit, person-to-large audience
communications. See Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control.
Renewing the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media,
104 YALE L.J. 1619, 1622-26, 1629-32 (1995).
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owned backbone networks, may be permissible, and even
desirable."' The important open question is whether the network
is likely to evolve towards a monopolistic or oligopolistic structure, in
which one or a few persons control the important arteries. If this
occurred, access requirements would seem highly desirable to prevent
the entity controlling the network from discriminating against speech
it disfavors. If, however, a number of competing communications
networks come into being, as seems to be happening with the
Internet, common carrier regulation would seem unnecessary, unduly
burdensome, and therefore presumptively unconstitutional. These
questions can only be answered over time. With respect to other
regulatory approaches, however, answers can be suggested. In
particular, broad restrictions on vertical integration12 would almost
certainly be unconstitutional. In a world in which the broadband
network has become .the primary means of communication, absent a
showing of enormous need and the lack of any regulatory alternatives,
such a prohibition would simply be too burdensome on the speech
rights of the regulated class to be sustained." Access regulation,
in an otherwise laissez-faire system, may therefore represent the
constitutional limit on regulation.
In this regard, one could argue that government ownership of a
backbone broadband network is the best way to ensure free access to
a diversity of users, given the constitutional bars to regulating private
owners.31 4 Certainly, construction of a network by the government
may well be desirable, though perhaps financially implausible. Given
the danger of misuse of editorial power by network managers,
however, one should view government restrictions upon the construc-
tion of competing broadband networks with suspicion, and any
attempt to establish a legal monopoly over the transmission network,
311. For an argument in favor of some forms of access rights to the infobahn, see
Berman & Weitzner, supra note 310, at 1624-26; Henry H. Penitt, Jr., Access to the
National Information Infrastructure, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 51 (1995). For an
argument opposing common carrier regulation, see Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 195,
at 1737-39.
312. By this I mean a ban on the use of the network by the owners of network
facilities.
313. For an argument in favor of such restrictions, but recognizing the burden that they
would impose, see The Message in the Medium, supra note 20, at 1096-97.
314. For a discussion of the importance of diversity, see supra notes 164-71 and accom-
panying text.
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especially a government-owned monopoly, should be presumptively
unconstitutional.315
In fact, if a widely used and interactive broadband network does
come into being in this country, many of the constitutional and
regulatory problems outlined in this article may become moot. There
is reason to hope that such a medium would permit easy, low-cost
access for multiple programmers, who would be able to produce a
broad diversity of programming and distribute it at quite low cost to
a widespread, voluntary viewership? 16 Were this scenario to come
about, it could substantially reduce the current stranglehold held by
the mass media over information dissemination, especially in electoral
politics. Indeed, there is some evidence that the current Internet,
even though only narrow band, is beginning to play such a role.3 17
If these trends continue and spread to video, there may be hope yet
for a truly free market in ideas and values.
CONCLUSION
In pursuing the chimera of a universally applicable First
Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court has created a doctrine that
is in theoretical disarray. In the context of modem mass media
regulation in particular, the Court's current two-tier doctrine simply
does not work, nor does it advance any plausible First Amendment
policies, because the doctrine is premised on an underlying model of
unitary and atomistic speech markets that, in the mass media context,
does not hold. A rethinking is therefore clearly in order.
This Article seeks to provide such a rethinking. Starting with the
example of cable television regulation, it demonstrates the failure of
traditional analysis, and then presents an alternative. This alternative
is based upon two key premises. The first is an instrumental
approach to the First Amendment. The second is a very broad view
of the political components of culture, and a concomitant skepticism
315. However, the government may be able to justify some limitations on construction
because of possible disruptions to the use of streets and other government-owned property
during the construction process. Any such restrictions, involving as they would the
government's management of its own property rather than general mass media regulation,
raise difficult, and inevitably ad hoc, balancing issues. See supra part I.B.2.
316. For a short discussion of how this might happen, see Olcott, supra note 29, at
1569-71.
317. For example, there are press reports that the Internet was used widely, and
successfully, by the opponents of former Speaker of the House Thomas Foley in defeating
his 1994 bid for reelection to the Congress. See Thomas Farragher, Politicians View
High-tech Highway as Modern Road to Votes, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 3, 1994, at A13.
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regarding constitutional theories that favor explicitly political speech.
Given these premises, it follows that, at least in the mass media
context, governmental or majoritarian manipulation of cultural
formation should be the primary evil against which First Amendment
policy is directed. Finally, this Article demonstrates that a general
preference for market mechanisms and structural methods of
regulating speech are the most effective ways to guard against this
danger.
Some doctrinal implications follow from these considerations. A
revised doctrine, in turn, suggests some precise constitutional limits on
the regulation of the cable, print, and broadcast media. The new,
interactive media, such as the current Internet and the wideband
Information Superhighway to come, present perhaps the most
intriguing issues, because of their position in-between the traditional
mass media and a system of private communications. While some
regulation of transmission facilities may become necessary, in the long
run there is hope that such technologies may create truly open and
accessible marketplaces in ideas, and obviate the need for ongoing
government intervention.

